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The Uniform Commercial Code Sales Article
Compared With West Virginia Law*
Part II
WILLARD D. LORENSEN"
Section 2-301. General Obligations of Parties.
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that
of the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract.
Perhaps the most significant thing about this provision is its
avoidance of the use of the term "condition" which was used, in
juxtaposition to the term "warranty" in the Sales Act.74 The nice
distinction between a failure of a condition-which relieved the other
party from performing-and a breach of warranty-which did not
relieve but merely gave a right of action for the breach to the other
party-is neatly avoided.7" The term condition is still employed in
the Code, as, for example, in section 2-507 which provides that the
seller's tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty to accept
the goods, but overly technical, non-commercial concern for "con-
ditions" generally is avoided. Section 2-506, for example, specifically
permits a seller to "cure" an improper tender under certain situa-
tions; moreover the official comments to the present section 2-301,
stress again that obligations to perform in "accordance to the con-
tract" shall be determined with reference to "usage of trade, course
of dealing and performance, and the general background of cir-
cumstances . . . [considered] in conjunction with the lay meaning
of the words used to define the scope of the conditions and
duties. . ....
Section 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
* This article originated in the December issue of the Review.
** Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.74 See 1 WLLiSTON, SALES §§ 178-82 (rev. ed. 1948). UNIFORM SALES
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was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract
or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its com-
mercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
There is presently no express principle in West Virginia law
which corresponds with the "unconscionable" provision of the Code.
A parallel may be found in the equity principle that specific per-
formance will be denied contracts which are not "fair and equit-
able." ' The Code provision of course would not bar merely specific
enforcement of a contract but would refuse to give any cognizance,
legal or equitable, to a clause or contract found unconscionable. In
this broad aspect, the Code provision runs contrary to general state-
ments of the West Virginia court to the effect that the wisdom or
folly of a contract is not a matter of judicial concern.'-
The position of the Code is that courts actually do enforce an
unstated rule against unconscionability by "adverse construction of
language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or
by determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or
to the dominant purpose of the contract.""8 This theory could be
arguably supported by West Virginia cases where lack of mutuality, 9
waiver,8" strict enforcement of forfeiture provisions8' and the like
have been employed to avoid results that might otherwise be char-
acterized as unconscionable. And it should be noted also that state-
ments that courts are unconcerned with the fairness of the bargain
76See West Virginia cases discussed in Note, 30 W. VA. L. Q. 293
(1930).7 7 Griffen v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S.E. 24 (1906).
In Continental Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Product Coal Co., 104 W. Va.
44, 58, 138 S.E. 1737, 742 (1906) the court, dealing with the granting
away of subjacent support, said: "[T]he courts enforce the agreement
[a mining lease] on the same principles governing ordinary contract, how-
ever harsh and unreasonable they may be."7 8 U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
79Motor Car Supply Co. v. General Household Utilities Co., 80 F.2d
167 (4th Cir. 1935). See, Sterling Organ Co. v. House, 25 W. Va. 64 (1884).80 Buskirk Bros. v. Peck, 57 W. Va. 360, 50 S.E. 432 (1905).
81 See v. Hardy Motor Co., 118 W. Va. 676, 1919 S.E. 580 (1937).
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
struck in a contract are normally prefaced with the qualification that
such burdensome obligations will be enforced where the language of
the contract is clear. In short, before contracts can be enforced,
their meaning must be ascertained. At this fork in the road, courts
are usually farsighted enough to see an unconscionable result looming
along one path and no doubt permit considerations of such un-
comfortable destinations to shape their determinations that there may
be an ambiguity lurking in the contract language which opens an
alternative path."
Whether the end result flowing from the law of contract in this
state would be affected by the adoption of this Code provision could
be argued long and hard from either point of view.
It is clear however that the technique for handling contract pro-
visions which could lead to unconscionable results is clearly changed
by the Code provision. The court is specifically authorized to hear
evidence which bears upon the question of the unconscionability of
the clause or contract in question. Thus whether a given provision
legitimately protects the interests of one of the contracting parties
or merely affords a surprising and unjustifiable means of avoiding
fair obligations may be considered in the light of commercial practice
or any other relevant evidence. Such determinations are of course
open to review by appellate courts and guides for future actions can
thus be developed. 3
Section 2-303. Allocation or Division of Risks.
Where this Article allocates a risk or a burden as between the
parties "unless otherwise agreed", the agreement may not only shift
the allocation but may also divide the risk or burden.
This provision basically restates present West Virginia law.
Contracting parties are free to make their own law so far as their
own transactions are concerned, so long as minimal requirements
of a valid contract are met.8" An overzealous shifting of burdens
82 See Hall Mining Co. v. Consolidated Fuel Co., 69 W. Va. 47, 70
S.E. 857 (1911) and cases cited in note 77, supra. Note also the discussion
of the rather arbitrary nature of a determination that contract language is
or is not ambiguous in Hartman v. Windsor Hotel Co., 136 W. Va. 681,
68 S.E.2d 746 (1951).
81See Note, 45 VA. L. Rv. 583 (1959) and Note, 45 IowA L. REv.
843 (1960) for well considered discussions of the test of "unconscionability."84 Barnes v. Koontz, 112 W. Va. 48, 163 S.E. 719 (1932); Continental
Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Product Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 44, 138 S.E.
737 (1927); Griffen v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S.E, 24 (1906).
[ Vol. 64
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and risks of course may result in the absence of a contract due to
a lack of mutuality of obligations, but this, of course, requires an
extreme case."5
Under the law of sales as it presently stands, the allocations
of many risks depends upon the location of title, and the point at
which title to the goods involved changes from the seller to the
buyer depends upon the intent of the parties.86 Thus, these many
title-related risks are definitely subject to the terms of the agreement,
though litigated cases show that this matter is rarely dealt with ex-
plicitly within the contract of sale. Moreover, risks and burdens
can be allocated by express agreement without reference to title.8"
In J. E. Poling Co. v. Huffman & Frost,8 the buyer and seller agreed
that lumber sold would be held on the seller's mill site at seller's risk
as to fire loss though the timber had been felled, manufactured into
lumber and marked with the buyer's brand. The court held that
under these circumstances the title to the lumber thus manufactured
had passed to the buyer (and thus was not subject to attachment
by the seller's creditors) when stacked at the seller's mill, even though
the seller continued to bear the risk of fire loss.
The official comments to the section note that the division of
risks may be found not only in the express terms of the agreement,
but also in the "attending circumstances." As to risks flowing from
possession of title, this statement accurately reflects the present state
of West Virginia law, since resort to such surrounding circumstances
usually is necessary to seek out the "intent" as to when title was
to pass.89 As to risks and burdens not directly attributable to posses-
sion of title, present West Virginia law would not, at least on the
surface, emphasize quite so much these surrounding circumstances
85 Motor Car Supply Co. v. General Household Utilities Co. 80 F.2d
167 (4th Cir. 1935); Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co. 47 W. Va. 84,
34 S.E. 923 (1900).
86 Moore v. Patchin, 71 W. Va. 192, 76 S.E. 426 (1912); See numerous
other cases holding to the same effect under discussion of section 2-401.87 E.g. Osborn & Co. v. Francis, 38 W. Va. 312, 18 S.E. 591 (1893)
(where evidence sustained a sale on approval, seller bore the risk of subject
of sale satisfying buyer, and buyer could arbitrarily refuse to accept goods
delivered); Greenbrier Lumber Co. v. Ward, 36 W. Va. 573, 15 S.E. 89
(1892) (seller to deliver on banks of named stream "secure from high
water" timber lost in high water held seller's loss.)
88 84 W. Va. 199, 99 S.E. 445 (1919).89 E.g. Acme Food Co. v. Older, 64 W. Va. 255, 61 S.E. 235 (1908);
Buskirk Bros. v. Peck, 57 W. Va. 360, 50 S.E. 432 (1905). See also cases
cited under discussion of section 2-401.
19621
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but would emphasize more the language employed in the agreement."'
This subject is discussed in more detail in the comments to the
parole evidence and practical construction sections."'
Section 2-304. Price Payable in Money, Goods, Realty, or Other-
wise.
(1) The price can be made payable in money or otherwise.
If it is payable in whole or in part in goods each party is a seller
of the goods which he is to transfer.
(2) Even though all or part of the price is payable in an
interest in realty the transfer of the goods and the seller's obligations
with reference to them are subject to this Article, but not the trans-
fer of the interest in realty or the transferor's obligations in con-
nection therewith.
What might otherwise be termed a barter, an exchange of goods
for goods rather than goods for money, is brought within the Code
by this provision so far as the exchange relates to goods. The Uni-
form Sales Act took a contrary stand so far as subsection (2) is
concerned and excluded from its ambit deals involving an exchange
of goods for real estate.92 Sturgill v. Luvell Lumber Co.93 character-
ized an exchange of personalty for personalty as a sale because the
transaction was based upon dollar value, i.e., seller took an engine
plus 700 dollars worth of lumber for an engine worth 2,700 dollars.
The inference is that had the exchange involved a particular pile of
lumber, or lumber contained in a designated shed, the transaction
might have been characterized a barter and not a sale.
Section 2-305. Open Price Term.
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for
sale even though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is
a reasonable price at the time for delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
9 0E.g. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co. v. Gilbert, 131 W. Va. 88, 46
S.E.2d 225 (1948). (Court will not look to surrounding circumstances to
determine intent of parties and meaning of contract unless contract is subject
to more than one interpretation.)
91 See discussion of sections 2-202 and 2-208, supra.92 UNIFORM SALns ACT § 9 (3).
93 132 W. Va. 172, 51 S.E.2d 126 (1948).
[ Vol. 64
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(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they
fail to agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed
market or other standard as set or recorded by a third
person or agency and it is not so set or recorded.
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a
price for him to fix in good faith.
(3) When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement
of the parties fails to be fixed through fault of one party the other
may at his option treat the contract as cancelled or himself fix a
reasonable price.
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless
the price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there is
no contract. In such a case the buyer must return any goods already
received or if unable so to do much [sic] pay their reasonable value
at the time of delivery and the seller must return any portion of
the price paid on account.94
West Virginia has recognized in principle the view espoused by
this provision, but the section anticipates and resolves many ques-
tions to which present West Virginia law provides no answer. In
Sterling Organ Co. v. House,95 a buyer was permitted to recover
damages for the seller's failure to supply organs ordered for resale
even though no specific price had been set for the particular organs
ordered. The court held that the jury could determine a reasonable
price.
It should be noted that the provision pays careful attention to
the intent of the parties. Subsection (1) starts with the language,
"The parties if they so intend" can conclude a contract without the
price being settled. And subsection (4) again emphasizes the point
that the contracting parties must intend to be bound without the
price being fixed before such agreements may be enforced. This
question of intent is, of course, usually a question for the trier of
fact.
94 The word "much" appears in the 1958 official edition of the Code.
The word intended is "must:'
95 25 W. Va. 64 (1884). See also Tide Water Oil Sales Co. v. Jarvis,
114 W. Va. 493, 172 S.E. 522 (1933). (Dealer-buyer's purchase price fixed
by seller's local "tank wagon" price.)
1962 ]
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Section 2-306. Output, Requirements and Exclusive Dealings.
(1) A term which measures the quantity by the output of the
seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output
or requirements as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity
unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the
absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable
prior output or requirements may be tendered or demanded.
(2) A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for
exclusive dealing in the kind of goods concerned imposes unless
otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to
supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote
their sale.
West Virginia presently is in accord with subsection (1) of
this provision. 6 In Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake & Export
Coal Corp.,9" the West Virginia court specifically upheld the validity
of an output contract against arguments that it was void for want
of mutuality or for uncertainty. The court held that the producer
was bound to continue production in good faith during the term of
the contract and that the quantity of coal involved in the contract
was governed by good faith operation of the mine in the usual and
ordinary way. There is, however, one slight modification of the
view of the Fayette-Kanawha case implicit in the present section.
In the Fayette-Kanawha case, the court forbade the plaintiff-seller
to base his recovery on the expanded output resulting from improve-
ments to his mine which the plaintiff alleged both he and defendant
buyer anticipated at the time of entering into the contract.98 The
official comments to the section note that "normal expansion under-
taken in good faith would be within the scope of this section." '99
It would thus seem that the quantity involved in a case such as
Fayette-Kanawha should be left to the trier of fact.
Subsection (2) expressly states a "best efforts" requirement in
exclusive dealing contracts. There is no specific West Virginia law
96 The validity of an output contract was assumed without any discussion
in Fox v. Ritter-Burns Lumber Co., 91 W. Va. 542, 114 S.E. 141 (1922).
In the later Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co., case, see note 97, infra, and discus-
sion in text above, the validity of such a contract was expressly dealt with.
See generally, Note 42 W. VA. L. Q. 154 (1936).
9791 W. Va. 132, 112 S.E. 222 (1922).
98 Id., syl. 7.
99 U.C.C. § 2-306, Comment 2.
[ Vol. 64
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on this point.' 0 It should be noted that this subsection starts with
the terms: "A lawful agreement. . ." It thus does not attempt to
make lawful exclusive dealing contracts which under existing con-
tract principles would be unlawful as a restraint upon trade.'
Section 2-307. Delivery in Single Lot or Several Lots.
Unless otherwise agreed all goods called for by a contract for
sale must be tendered in a single delivery and payment is due only
on such tender but where the circumstances give either party the
right to make or demand delivery in lots the price if it can be ap-
portioned may be demanded for each lot.
Where the parties do not specifically agree upon delivery in a
single lot or several lots, this section provides the rule to be applied.
The assumption is that delivery is to be in a single lot, but circum-
stances may indicate the contrary, in which case delivery in several
lots is permissible and payment for each delivery may be demanded
upon such tender if the price due is apportionable. The policy of this
section is generally in keeping with the view of the West Virginia
Supreme Court expressed in Tuggle v. Belcher.2 There a seller
refused to accept an order for two car loads of a certain kind of
lumber because he was uncertain of his ability to deliver more than
one car load. The agent of buyer agreed to take one car load im-
mediately and the second car load on an "if available" basis. The
buyer refused to pay for the first car load unless the second was
shipped, and seller refused to ship the second until paid for the first.
The court held for the buyer and ruled he could recover for the
first car load and was justified in not shipping the second.
More detailed rules regarding proper delivery and tender are
stated in section 2-508. The present section is principally con-
cerned only with establishing a rule for determining whether single
10 °In House v. Sterling Organ Co., 25 W. Va. 64 (1884) the court
seemed to infer that a buyer for resale of organs could not enforce the"exclusive" feature of his contract with the manufacturer since a patented
product was not involved, but this point was not relevant to the determina-
ton of the case. Exclusive dealing contracts are now generally held valid,
see 5 WmILisToN, CoNTRAcrs § 1645 (3d ed. 1937) and the validity of such
has been specificaly sustained in West Virginia, Thurmond v. Paragon: Col-
liery Co., 82 W. Va. 49, 95 S.E. 816 (1918).
oI See, Pocahontas Coke Co. v. Powhatan Coal & Coke Co., 60 W. Va.
508, 56 S.E. 264 (1918).
102 104 W. Va. 178, 139 S.E. 653 (1927).
1962]
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or multiple deliveries are authorized where there is no express
agreement.
Section 2-308. Absence of Specified Place for Delivery.
Unless otherwise agreed
(a) the place for delivery of goods is the seller's place of
business or if he has none his residence; but
(b) in a contract for sale of identified goods which to the
knowledge of the parties at the time of contracting
are in some other place, that place is the place for
their delivery; and
(d) documents of title may be delivered through customary
banking channels.
There is no West Virginia authority bearing directly upon the
matters dealt with in this provision. Two points from the official
comments may bear special note here however. First, this is another
"unless otherwise agreed" provision, one which establishes a rule
where the parties have not either expressly or impliedly provided
for a place of delivery. Second, subsection (c) relating to docu-
ments of title provides that ordinary banking channels may be used
for delivery of documents of title. This means that due notification
by the bank that such documents are on hand completes the delivery
and that the buyer is obligated to arrange the physical receipt of
the goods. Such documents do not have to be presented personally
to the buyer.
Section 2-309. Absence of Specific Time Provisions; Notice of
Termination.
(1) The time for shipment or delivery or any other action
under a contract if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall
be a reasonable time.
(2) Where the contract provides for successive performances
but is indefinite in duration it is valid for a reasonable time but
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(3) Termination of a contract by one party except on the
happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification
be received by the other party and an agreement dispensing with
notification is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable.
Present West Virginia law is in accord with the provisions of
this section. In Greenbrier Lumber Co. v. Ward"°3 and Boyd v.
Gunnison,' 4 the West Virginia court has ruled that the time for
delivery in absence of agreement between the parties on this point
is a reasonable time. There is no specific ruling in any case in
this state which accords with subsection (2) dealing with successive
performance where no duration for such performances are fixed.
However, Sterling Organ Co. v. House' supports this point by in-
ference. There a manufacturer of organs attempted to avoid liability
for failure to supply seven of ten organs ordered by House by
claiming it had the right to cancel its agreement to sell without
giving notice to the buyer. The court held that the arrangement
whereby House sold the manufacturer's organs continued at the
pleasure of both parties and could not be terminated without reason-
able notice by the party seeking to dissolve the arrangement to
the other party. In this respect, the rule of the Sterling Organ case
is in complete accord with subsection (3). The manufacturer at-
tempted to establish a right to cancel without notice as a matter
of usage of the trade. The court held that evidence of such a usage
of trade could be denied solely on the basis that it was "un-
reasonable."
Section 2-310. Open Time for Payment or Running of Credit;
Authority to Ship Under Reservation.
Unless otherwise agreed
(a) payment is due at the time and place at which the
buyer is to receive the goods even though the place of
shipment is the place of delivery; and
(b) if the seller is authorized to send the goods he may
ship them under reservation, and may tender the docu-
ments of title, but the buyer may inspect the goods
103 36 W. Va. 573, 15 S.E. 89 (1892).
104 14 W. Va. 1 (1878).
105 25 W. Va. 64 (1884).
1962]
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after their arrival before payment is due unless such
inspection is inconsistent with the terms of the contract
(Section 2-513); and
(c) if delivery is authorized and may by way of docu-
ments of title otherwise than by subsection (b) then
payment is due at the time and place at which the
buyer is to receive the documents regardless of where
the goods are to be received; and
(d) where the seller is required or authorized to ship the
goods on credit the credit period runs from the time
of shipment but post-dating the invoice or delaying
its dispatch will correspondingly delay the starting of
the credit period.
Subsection (b) along with some other provisions of the Code '
would bring about a change in West Virginia law but otherwise this
provision would essentially fill an existing void in the law of this
state. Back & Greiwe v. Smith,' 7 decided in 1909, held that by
shipping under reservation, the seller retained title and risk to goods
sent and thus the buyer was justified in rejecting the tender because
of damage occurring to the goods during transit. In effect then,
Back & Greiwe held that authority to ship under reservation is not
presumed in absence of an agreement on this point. This view is,
of course, inconsistent with the Code provision, and it is somewhat
inconsistent too with the right of a seller to stop in transit, a right
recognized in a subsequent West Virginia case.' 8
Subsection (a) may appear at first reading to be awkwardly
phrased, but there is good reason for the use of the terminology
employed. In general, the common law viewed "delivery" and
"payment" as concurrent conditions. ' 9 The phrasing of the sub-
section is carefully drawn to avoid possible confusion which may
arise here, because delivery may be complete upon placing the
goods in the hands of a carrier, but the buyer is not obligated to
106 See sections 2-401, 2-505, and 2-509.
107 66 W. Va. 47, 66 S.E. 1 (1909).
108 Sharp v. Campbell, 89 W. Va. 526, 109 S.E. 611 (1921). Shipment
under reservation is "somewhat" different because it does not depend upon
the insolvency of the buyer, where the right to stop in transit does.
109 2 WmLISTON, SALS § 447 (rev. ed. 1948).
[ Vol. 64
11
Lorensen: The Uniform Commercial Code Sales Article Compared with West Virg
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1962
COMMERCIAL CODE--SALES
pay until the time he "is to receive" the goods-which of course
occurs later, at the end of the transit.""
Subsections (c) and (d) cover points on which there is no
present West Virginia authority.
Section 2-311. Options and Cooperation Respecting Performance.
(1) An agreement for sale which is otherwise sufficiently
definite (subsection (3) of Section 2-204) to be a contract is not made
invalid by the fact that it leaves particulars of performance to be
specified by one of the parties. Any such specification must be made
in good faith and within limits set by commercial reasonableness.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed specifications relating to assort-
ment of the goods are at the buyer's option and except as otherwise
provided in subsections (1) (c) and (3) of Section 2-319 specifications
or arrangements relating to shipment are at the seller's option.
(3) Where such specification would materially affect the other
party's performance but is not reasonably made or where one party's
cooperation is necessary to the agreed performance of the other but
is not seasonably forthcoming, the other party in addition to all
other remedies
(a) is excused for any resulting delay in his own perform-
ance; and
(b) may also either proceed to perform in any reasonable
manner or after the time for a material part of his
own performance treat the failure to specify or to
cooperate as a breach by failure to deliver or accept
the goods.
Of the three major points covered by this provision, present
West Virginia law is generally in accord on two and is silent on
the third. The principal effect of this provision would be elabora-
tion and clarification.
Several cases have involved the enforcement of contracts under
which one of the parties had to specify "particulars of perform-
1"oThe common law "concurrent condition' concept is qualified by the
buyer's usual right to inspect before payment. 2 WmILISTON, SALES § 448a
(rev. ed. 1948). One West Virginia case generally supports the rule stated
in subsection (a), Tuggle v. Belcher, 104 W. Va. 178, 139 S.E. 653 (1927).
1962]
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ance."' 11 In Boyd v. Gunnison,' 2 it was left to the buyer to designate
one of three cities as the point of delivery. Several lumber sales
cases have involved contracts for a given quantity of lumber, the
amount and assortment of lumber to be delivered in any one ship-
ment being left to be designated during the performance of the
contract. Thus, present law in this state is in accord with subsection
(1) and the effect of the adoption of this part of the provision
would be a codification and clarification of existing law.
Subsection (2) spells out buyer's and seller's rights to par-
ticularize in absence of contrary agreements arising either expressly
or by implication from trade usage, course of dealing or the like.
Present West Virginia law is silent on this point. The exceptions
referred to in subsection (2) relating to parts of section 2-319 of
the Code generally involve instances where the buyer is bound to
designate a vessel on which the goods are to be shipped.
Subsection (3) deals with the consequences of a failure by one
party to particularize or make known how the performance by the
other party is to be accomplished. Where such a failure occurs, the
party who awaits the other party's particularization "is excused
for any resulting delay" in his own performance. This restates the
holding of Wheeling Mold & Foundry Co. v. Wheeling Steel & Iron
Co.," 3 where the construction of certain machines was delayed by
the buyer's failure to make available promptly certain specifications
for the machines. The court stressed that the plaintiff seller was
bound to show the extent of delay attributable to the buyer's pro-
crastination. In this respect, the holding in the Wheeling case ac-
cords with the "resulting delay" view of the proposed Code section.
In addition, the party who is frustrated by the other's failure to
particularize may either perform in a reasonable manner or treat
the other party's failure as a breach. No West Virginia case spe-
cifically recognizes the alternative of "performance in a reasonable
manner" (such as by shipping a standard assortment of goods
where the buyer has failed to particularize the assortment desired).
113 Queen v. Kenova Hardwood Flooring Co., 114 W. Va. 623, 173
S.E. 559 (1934); Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake & Export Coal Co., 91
W. Va. 132, 112 S.E. 222 (1922); Wiggin v. Marsh Lumber Co., 77 W. Va.
7, 87 S.E. 194 (1915); Wheeling Mold & Foundry Co. v. Wheeling Steel &
Iron Co., 62 W. Va. 288, 57 S.E. 826 (1907); Boyd v. Gunnison, 14 W. Va.
1 (1879).
112 14 W. Va. 1 (1879).
113 62 W. Va. 288, 57 S.E. 826 (1907).
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There is authority which recognizes the second or "breach" option.
In Wiggin v. Marsh Lumber Co.,114 where the seller repeatedly failed
to inform the buyer of what kinds of lumber were available for in-
spection and thence shipping orders, the court held that the buyer
could treat such failure as a breach and recover damages.
Section 2-312. Warranty of Title and Against Infringement;
Buyer's Obligation Against Infringement.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a
warranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer right-
ful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security
interest or other lien or encumbrance of which the
buyer at the time of contracting has no knowledge.
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or
modified only by specific language or by circumstances which give
the buyer reason to know that the person selling does not claim
title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right or title
as he or a third person may have.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly
dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered
free of the rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement
or the like but a buyer who furnishes specifications to the seller must
hold the seller harmless against any such claim which arises out
of compliance with the specifications.
West Virginia has recognized the implied warranty of title but
the various incidents of this rule have never been developed by the
case law. The subsection dealing with a warranty against infringe-
ment would be new to West Virginia law.
The West Virginia cases which have given rise to the recogni-
tion of the implied warranty of title basically involved but one facet
11477 W. Va. 7, 87 S.E. 194 (1915); accord, Queen v. Kenova Hardwood
Flooring Co., 114 W. Va. 623, 173 S.E. 559 (1934) (where seller failed to
inspect at point of delivery as court held seller was bound to do, buyer
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of this warranty: May a buyer resist payment of the purchase price
if the seller did not have title to the property sold."' 5 The answer
has been consistently yes. This position is in line with common
law authority generally,116 and it was the position built upon in the
Uniform Sales Act. That Act elaborated upon the implied war-
ranty of title to provide that the seller impliedly warranted: (1) his
right to sell; (2) the buyer's right to quiet enjoyment; and (3) that
the property was free of incumbrance at the time of sale."" The
Sales Act resolved the variety of opinions on the question of when
a cause of action arose under the breach of the implied warranty
of title, and consequently when the statute of limitations barred an
action for the breach. The combination of a warranty of the right
to sell-which was breached at the time of sale if at all-and the
right to quiet enjoyment-which was breached only when such en-
joyment was interfered with, combined to give substantial protection
to the buyer.
The Commercial Code provision omits reference to quiet en-
joyment." '8 The practical effect of this is to limit the period of time
during which a seller may become liable for a breach of the implied
warranty of title. Section 2-725 of the Code places a four year
statute of limitations on actions brought under the sales article, and
providing generally that the cause of action for a breach occurs when
tender of delivery is made." 9 Thus under the Sales Act, a cause
of action could arise years after a sales transaction for breach of
warranty of quiet possession, but under the Commercial Code, the
"1-Striza v. First National Bank, 97 W. Va. 359, 125 S.E. 150 (1924);
Cogar v. Bums Lumber Co., 46 W. Va. 256, 33 S.E. 219 (1899); Jarrett
v. Goodnow, 39 W. Va. 602, 20 S.E. 575 (1894); Burnside v. Burdett, 15
W. Va. 702 (1879).
116 1 WmLISTON, SALES § 218 (rev. ed. 1948).
117 UNDFORM SALns ACT § 13.
""The ommission is intentional. The official comments to the section
state: 'The warranty of quiet possession is abolished. Disturbance of quiet
possession, although not mentioned specifically, is one way, among many,
in which the breach of the warranty of title may be established."
1"Breach of certain kinds of warranties may arise after tender of
delivery, and thus extend the time during which an action for such breach
may be maintained.- Subsection (2) of Section 2-725 reads, in part, as
follows: "A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made,
except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of
the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such per-
formance the cause of action accrues when the breach is to should have
been discovered." The official comment to the title warranty section makes it
clear that "the [title] warranty is not one which extends to 'future per-
formance of the goods."'
[ Vol. 64
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possibility of an action based upon such a breach expires four years
after the tender.12
The implied warranty of title does not arise where there is an
adequate disclaimer or the circumstances are such that the buyer
should be aware that the seller is not dealing with goods that are
his absolutely. To disclaim takes specific language, viz., a sale of
goods "as is" would not be adequate to disclaim the warranty of
title."' Exclusion of the warranty by circumstances deals with
sales by foreclosing lienors, executors, and the like.'22
Subsection (3) deals with a warranty against infringement. No
West Virginia authority exists on this point. The prevailing view is
that a seller impliedly warrants against infringement.
23
Section 2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promises, De-
scription, Sample.
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirma-
tion or promise.
120 HA KLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 40 (1958): "Under the rule of
the Uniform Sales Act, if the quiet possession of goods of a buyer were
disturbed fifty years after he bought the goods, the seller could not utilize
the statute of limitations to bar buyer's breach of warranty action. Con-
sequently, sellers were forced by the rule in the Uniform Sales Act on the
warranty of quiet possession to keep their records long periods of time to
forestall or to defend such action. ..
121 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 41 (1958): "Because ... the
unsophisticated usually tend to associate quality and not title with warranty,
a full demonstration to the buyer that the title risks are his calls for
specific language directed toward that end......
122 The exclusion of an implied warranty of title under such circum-
stances is based on the reliance theory. It was at one time suggested that
no implied warranty of title would arise if the goods sold were not in the
possession of the seller, but the possession limitation seems to be withering.
See 1 WILsToN, SALES § 218 (rev. ed. 1948). In Jarrett v. Goodnow, 39
W. Va. 602, 20 S.E. 575 (1894) the statement that an implied warranty of
title arose from the sale of chattels was qualified with the phrase "where
the -goods are in the vendor's possession . . " but no elaboration upon this
possible limitation has occurred in subsequent cases.
123 See, Robertson, Implied Warranties of Non-Infringement, 44 MIcH.
L. REv. 933 (1946); Note, 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 673 (1959). See also
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(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made a part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty
that the seller use formal words as "warranty" or "guarantee" or that
he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation
merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be
merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty.
This provision reclassifies the warranties of description and
sample as express rather than implied warranties, but otherwise
make no substantial change in West Virginia law.
This state adopted the view that an express warranty is created
by an affirmation of fact or statement of quality by the seller in
Kemble v. Wiltison:'24
"Formerly, it was held that to constitute an express warranty,
it must be literally expressed, but it is now uniformly held
that the form in which the affirmation is made is of little im-
portance. Any affirmation made by the seller of personal
property as to its quality at the time of sale, or during the
negotiations resulting in the sale, will be treated as a warranty,
unless it appears that the purchaser did not rely thereon in
making the contract ..... ,, "
Thus, the language in subsection (1) (a) and the language of sub-
section (2) preceding the "puffing" proviso substantially restate
the present West Virginia view.
Subsection (1) (b) and (c) establish the warranties arising
from description and sample as express warranties. The only West
Virginia case dealing with a warranty arising from the use of a
sample did not deal with the question of whether this was an implied
12492 W. Va. 32, 114 S.E. 369 (1922).
1
25 d. at 38, 114 S.E. at 371.
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or express warranty. 2' On the other hand, the warranty arising
from a sale by description has been characterized on several oc-
casions as an implied warranty. 27 The classification of warranties
as express or implied has significance so far as disclaimers are con-
cerned. '28 A distinction in the method of treating disclaimers of
express and implied warranties is developed in section 2-316.
Warranties by description, dealt with in subsection (1) (b),
have been recognized on several occasions in West Virginia cases. '29
Such situations arise normally where the buyer orders goods for
future delivery from the buyer, and relies upon the seller's selection
of the specific articles to fulfill the contract of sale.
Warranties by sample dealt with in subsection (1) (c), pose
a problem a bit more difficult than warranties by affirmation or
description.
The only West Virginia case, American Canning Co. v. Flat
Top Grocery Co., ' ° dealing with warranty by sample could be read
as expressing a more restrictive view as to the creation of the war-
ranty than that posed by the Code provision. In accurately summing
up the views expressed in the body of the opinion, the court adopted
a two sentence syllabus which could lead to a conclusion of some
conflict. The first sentence states: "The fact that a sample is ex-
hibited does not necessarily make the transaction a sale by sample."
This suggests the problem of fact which is discussed in some detail
in the official comments to the Code section.2 There it is noted
that "the facts are often ambiguous when something is shown as
illustrative, rather than as a straight sample." The second sentence
of the syllabus merits a bit more explanation. It states: "The con-
126 American Canning Co. v. Flat Top Grocery Co., 68 W. Va. 698, 70
S.E. 756 (1910).
'2 7 Foutty v. Chalmax Sales Co. 99 W. Va. 300, 123 S.E. 389 (1925);
Kemble v. Wiltison, 92 W. Va. 32, 114 S.E. 369 (1922); Schaffner v. National
Supply Co., 80 W. Va. 111, 92 S.E. 580 (1917); Wilson v. Wiggin, 73 W. Va.
560, 81 S.E. 842 (1914); Hood v. Block Bros., 29 W. Va. 244, 11 S.E. 910
(1886).
128The official comments to the present section note this distinction
in regard to implied and express warranties: "'Express' warranties rest on
'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence
of that bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the
basic dickered terms. 'Implied' warranties rest so clearly on a common
factual situation or set of conditions that no particular language or action
is necessary to evidence them and they will arise in such a situation unless
unmistakably negated."
129 See note 127, supra.
120 68 W. Va. 698, 70 S.E. 756 (1910).
131 U.C.C. § 313, Comment 6.
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tract must evince intention to contract by sample." On the other
hand, the comments to the Code provision say: "In general, the
presumption is that any sample or model just as any affirmation of
fact is intended to become a basis of the bargain." Here there seems
to be a parting of the ways, but the divergence reflects a change in
the parole evidence rule, not necessarily any clash over the ease
with which a warranty by sample may arise. In the American
Canning case a sample was exhibited, but the written contract
made no reference to it and in fact stated a quality standard in-
dependent of the sample. Properly applying the existing parole evi-
deufce rule, the court held that reference to the sample would add
to the terms of the written agreement-thus evidence of such a sample
was not admissible. Under the parole evidence rule of the Code,
evidence of the exhibition of the sample and the nature of the
negotiations with reference to it would probably be admissible.' 32
When admitted, the issue of whether there was a warranty by sample
would then involve the fact question: Did the exhibition of the
sample amount to a mere illustration, or an inducing affirmation?
Section 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of
Trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their
sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be con-
sumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description; and
'3 2 The statement in the text is qualified because the parole evidence
rule is not abolished by the Code provision (2-202), but merely narrowed
by it. An additional consistent term not reduced to writing may be shown
but it is possible that the sample warranty not reduced to writing may have
been inconsistent with the warranty of quality included in the writing, in
which case the Code provision too would not admit evidence of the sample
warranty.
In the American Canning Co. case the written warranty apparently re-
lated only to the fill of the can and the ratio of solid to fluid content of
the can. The defendant's complaint under the asserted warranty by sample
was not clear, but the sample warranty could have been consistent with
the written warranty; e.g., the color and appearance of the berries contained
in the cans could be warranted by the sample while the nature of the pack
warranted by written description. If such were the case, the Code parole
evidence provision would admit evidence relating to the asserted warranty
by sample, while the present parole evidence rule would not.
[ Vol. 64
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(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average
quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement,
of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and
among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as
the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made
on the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied
warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
This provision and the one following deal with implied war-
ranties. Their adoption would both enlarge and clarify the existing
law of implied warranty in this state. The present section deals with
the implied warranty of merchantability. The following section deals
with a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The present
section, warranty of merchantability, is based on a policy which has
gained wide, though not universal acceptance, viz., when purchasing
goods from a merchant who deals in goods of the kind sold, the
buyer may assume that the goods are of merchantable quality or
generally fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
The section dealing with fitness for a particular purpose requires
something more than a mere sale by a merchant to be shown to
establish an implied warranty. Under this latter section, the emphasis
shifts to an actual reliance upon the skill and knowledge of the
merchant. Under the former section of merchantability, reliance
is not relevant save when positive acts by the buyer demonstrate
that he is in fact not relying on the merchant's skill or knowledge
but rather upon his own examination of the goods in question. 3
The distinction is here emphasized as present West Virginia law blends
"fitness" warranties generally and much confusion results.'34
133 Code section 2-316 (3) (b) deals with the exclusion of warranties
resulting from buyer's examination prior to sale. Such examination may
preclude the existence of an implied warranty of merchantability.134 Millenson v. Lamp, 99 W. Va. 539, 130 S.E. 137 (1925). This is
a prime example of the confusion of a warranty of merchantability and a
warranty of fitness for a special purpose.
19621
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In general terms, this would be the impact of Section 2-314 on
existing West Virginia law: (1) the warranty of merchantability
would be expanded. The most significant expansion would occur
by the elimination of the "sealed container" exception to that war-
ranty which is currently recognized in this state."' (2) The sale of
restaurant food and the like would clearly be a sale with implied
warranties attaching. Whether such transactions amount to sales
is presently an open question in this state." 6 (3) The quality de-
manded by the warranty of merchantability would be greatly elab-
orated by subsection (2).
West Virginia has recognized an implied warranty of merchanta-
bility in numerous cases." 7 It was first dealt with in Hood v. Bloch
Bros., 8 where a merchant buyer resisted payment of full price for
a lot of cheese on the grounds that much of that delivered was not
merchantable. The buyer won his point on appeal, the court saying:
"[Tin the sale of goods by description, where the buyer has not
inspected them, there is, in addition to the condition precedent that
the goods shall answer the description, an implied warranty that
"'Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117 W. Va. 680, 186 S.E. 610
(1936). Prosser indicates that this is a minority view. "The battle is now
very largely won for the buyer; . . ." PROSSER, TORTS § 83 (2d ed. 1955).
136 See, Note, Implied Warranty and the Sale of Restaurant Food, 63
W. VA. L. REv. 326 (1961).
137Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785
(1939) (sale of meat); Millenson v. Lamp, 99 W. Va. 539, 130 S.E. 137
(1925) (sale of player piano); Guyandotte Coal Co. v. Virginia Electric &
Mach. Works, 94 W. Va. 300, 118 S.E. 512 (1923) (sale of second-hand
mining machine); Appalachian Power Co. v. Tate, 90 W. Va. 428, 111 S.E.
150 (1922) (sale of refrigerator); Gorby v. Bridgeman, 83 W. Va. 727, 99
S.E. 88 (1919) (sale of new automobile); Hood, v. Block Bros., 29 W. Va.
244, 11 S.E. 910 (1866) (sale of cheese).
An implied warranty of merchantability was denied in the following
cases: Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117 W. Va. 680, 186 S.E. 610
(1936); (foot sold in sealed container); Continental Supply Co. v. Stephen-
son, 94 W. Va. 313, 118 S.E. 537 (1923) (seller had no drilling line in stock
as requested by buyer and at buyer's urging obtained a line from another
seller and billed it to buyer at seller's cost. "[I]n this transaction there
was absolutely no consideration paid or agreed to be paid to the plaintiff
for this warranty and there can be no warranty without consideration. .. .");
Showalter v. Chambers, 77 W. Va. 720, 88 S.E. 1072 (1916) (buyers ex-
amination prior to offer of purchase held to preclude reliance upon a war-
ranty of merchantability); Griffen v. Runion, 74 W. Va. 641, 82 S.E. 868
(1914) (sale of stallion by "The Imported Percheron Horse Co."-apparently
a merchant dealing in the kind of horse sold-the court held no implied
warranty of procreative ability in sale of a stallion.); Watkins v. Angotti,
65 W. Va. 193, 63 S.E. 969 (1909) (sale of machinery, apparently not by
a dealer in machines, but apparently by a former user of the machines,
no implied warranty allowed); Lambert v. Armentrout, 65 W. Va. 365,
64 S.E. 260 (1909) (sale of horse).
138 29 W. Va. 244, 11 S.E. 910 (1886).
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they shall be salable or merchantable."' 39 (Emphasis by the court.)
The reason given by the court in justification of this conclusion
however casts some doubt on the scope of the warranty of merchant-
ability in this state. Noting that the sale involved a producer
merchant as seller (i.e., someone who should know the quality of
the goods he is selling) and the subject matter of the sale was
stored at a distance from the place of sale (thus making inspection
at time of sale impractical) the court made the following statement:
"This necessary trust in and reliance upon the judgment and informa-
tion of the seller seems to be at the root of the doctrine of implied
warranty."''4 Thus the court seems to ground the implied warranty
of merchantability upon justifiable reliance.
In subsequent cases, this crucial element of justifiable reliance
has been alternately ignored and stressed. Its present role is at best
conjectural. In Gorby v. Bridgemen14' an implied warranty of
merchantability was attached to the sale of an automobile with no
mention made of the justifiable reliance element. Again, in Appa-
lachian Power Co. v. Tate'42 the warranty was attached to the sale
of a refrigerator with no mention of the justifiable reliance element.
But in Millenson v. Lamp,'4' decided just three years after Appa-
lachian Power, the court imposed a warranty of fitness on the sale
of a player piano and relief solely on the theory of the seller's superior
knowledge and skill. To this point, the warranty of merchantability
seemed to be blossoming in West Virginia law without too much
concern for the possible limitations that lay dormant in the justi-
fiable reliance element. Then came Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel
Co.,' and Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market'45 and a bizarre element
of confusion.
The Pennington case carved out the sealed container exception
and it did so strictly on the justifiable reliance theory.
"[The warranty of fitness] is based upon the fact that the seller
not only knows the purpose for which the goods are used, but
39 Id. at 252, 11 S.E. at 912.
' 40 d. at 255, 11 S.E. at 913-14.
"41 83 W. Va. 727, 99 S.E. 88 (1919).
14290 W. Va. 428, 111 S.E. 150 (1922).
143 99 W. Va. 539, 130 S.E. 137 (1925).
144117 W. Va. 680, 186 S.E. 610 (1936).
14 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939).
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that the circumstances are such as to make it appear that the
buyer has relied upon the skill and judgment of the seller to
supply his needs.
Can we say that in purchasing goods contained in a pack-
age known to have been sealed by the manufacturer or packer,
so that no opportunity is afforded the retail seller to inspect
the contents the buyer is relying upon the skill and judgment
of the seller as to the condition of what the sealed package
contains? The buyer knows that the seller has had no op-
portunity to exercise his experience, skill or judgment beyond
the selection of the person who manufactures or puts up the
goods in question.... ."46
Note that the court stresses the fact that where the buyer has no
reasonable grounds to expect the seller to have discovered the flaw,
he has no right to rely on an implication of fitness. In the Burgess
case, following the Pennington decision by some three years, an im-
plied warranty was imposed upon the sale of minced ham. "Of
course," said the court, "the purchaser must rely upon the seller's
judgment and integrity ... .,14' There was no showing in the Burgess
case that the merchant seller was aware or should have been aware
of the condition of the meat which caused the illness to the purchaser.
So far as the records show, the defects in both the Pennington case
and the Burgess case were equally latent and unknown to the sellers.
The implied warranty of merchantability would arise under the
Code provision only where the seller is a "merchant with respect to
goods of that kind." Thus, if a buyer purchases a used car from a
dealer in such cars, an implied warranty attaches,' 48 but if he pur-
chases from a private individual through a newspaper advertisement,
146 117 W. Va. 680, 684, 186 S.E. 610, 611.
147 121 W. Va. 605, 609, 5 S.E.2d 785, 787.
' 48 The mere fact that the goods are not new does not mean that an
implied warranty of merchantability does not attach. Guyandotte Coal Co.
v. Virginia Electric & Mach. Works, 94 W. Va. 300, 118 S.E. 512 (1923)
recognized the implied warranty of merchantability in connection with the
sale of a second hand mining machine. The official comments to the present
Code provision note (Comment 3): "A contract for the sale of second-hand
goods, however, involves only such obligation as is appropriate to such
goods for that is their contract description." For example, if new window
drapes were delivered with blemishes and noticeable spots of fading, this
would no doubt amount to a breach of the warranty of merchantability,
but if used drapes were purchased described by color and size, blemishes and
fades would not prevent them from being merchantable unless so extreme
as to make them reasonably unfit for use as drapes.
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no such warranty arises.'49 While no particular stress is laid on
this view in this context in the West Virginia case, the pattern of
results would not be disturbed by such a limitation on the implied
warranty of merchantability."' 0 The warranty of merchantability first
arose in sales by manufacturers and growers to others who purchased
for resale and not for use."5 The warranty then grew to cover
purchases for use and the Uniform Sales Act, codifying this ex-
pansion, noted that the warranty of merchantability applied whether
the seller was a "grower or manufacturer or not'" 2 The Code con-
tinues the same general policy.
Subsection (2) is unique in spelling out standards of quality
imposed by the warranty of merchantability. It is the first attempt
in this country to lend meaning to the warranty by statute." 3 The
most significant of the various attributes of merchantability is stated
in subsection (2) (c), that goods shall be "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used; . . ." Thus automobiles
should transport,'5 4 refrigerators should refrigerate 5 and player
pianos play. 5" Subsection (2) (f) deals specifically with affirma-
tions of fact or promises made on labels or containers. This avoids
the problem of whether a retailer adopts such statements as a part
of his transaction with the consumer.' The obligation runs also
of course from the supplier to the retailer.
Section 2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose.
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
14 9 The official comments point out however that the general obligation
of good faith expressed in the general article of the Code, section 1-203, would
demand that a non-merchant seller disclose known material hidden defects
which reasonable examination by the purchaser would not reveal.
150 See generally the cases in note 137, supra. In all cases in which a
warranty of merchantability has been imposed, the seller has been a merchant,
but in no case where the warranty has been denied has the court relied
upon the non-merchant status of the seller as a reason for denying an implied
warranty.
'5' LLEWELLYN, On Warranty of Quality and Society, 36 COLTJm. L. R v.
699 (1936).
'52 UNiro m SALES Acr § 15 (1).
'
5
3 VOLD, SALES § 89 (2d ed. 1959).
'.4 Gorby v. Bridgemen, 83 W. Va. 727, 99 S.E. 88 (1910).
155 Appalachian Power Co. v. Tate, 90 W. Va. 428, 111 S.E. 150 (1922).
1
56 Millenson v. Lamp, 99 W. Va. 539, 130 S.E. 137 (1925).
57 Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945).
(Dealer held not to have adopted warranties expressed on a label by mere
sale of goods.) Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., 266 App. Div. 5, 40
N.Y.S.2d 916 (1943). (Facts of sales transaction held to show dealer adopted
similar manufacturer warranties as his own.)
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any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that
the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
This provision would ease somewhat the burden on the buyer
desiring to establish a "particular purpose" warranty from that which
would be imposed by present West Virginia law. The particular
purpose warranty is recognized in this state, but as with the implied
warranty of merchantability, the precise nature of the particular
purpose warranty cannot be stated with accuracy.
The leading case in this state on the particular purpose war-
ranty is Schaffner v. National Supply Co. ' where the court rec-
ognized the warranty but maneuvered plaintiff's case around it and
concluded by affirming his right to recover on another warranty
theory. This is what the court said about the particular purpose
warranty:
"We conclude from these authorities that an implied war-
ranty of fitness of goods will arise when the buyer discloses
to the seller his needs or the purpose to which he intends
to apply the goods purchased, and orders from the seller such
goods as will meet those requirements, leaving it entirely to
the judgment of the seller as to what particular goods he will
supply; . . . " (Emphasis added) '59
The emphasized language in the above quotation illustrates the
distinction between the particular purpose warranty as it presently
exists in this state and the warranty as proposed in the Code pro-
vision. The Code provision relies upon the less stringent termi-
nology of "has reason to know" in describing the point of making
the seller cognizant that his skill and judgment are being relied upon.
There is a difference of emphasis here and other particular purpose
warranty cases in West Virginia generally reflect the more stringent
standard of the Schaffner case. 6
1-8 80 W. Va. 111, 92 S.E. 580 (1917).
159 Id. at 121, 92 S.E. at 584.
160 Buffalo Collieries Co. v. Indian Run Coal Co., 73 W. Va. 665, 81
S.E. 1055 (1914). (Seller changed method of handling coal to provide
washed instead of unwashed coal. Buyer, under a year long contract, objected
because washed coal froze in cars and mechanical unloading equipment
would not handle properly. The court ruled: "There is no implied warranty
E Vol. 64
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The actual disposition of the particular purpose warranty in
the Schaffner case, as well as the quoted language above, tends to
emphasize even more the distinction noted. After making the general
statement of the rule above quoted, the court continued in that case:
"[B]ut where the buyer discloses to the seller the purpose for
which he desires the goods and suggests than an article of a
particular kind is desired by him, and the seller cannot supply
the particular article, and the buyer thereupon orders such
other article, there will not arise any implied warranty that
the goods furnished will be fit for the purpose to which the
buyer intends to apply them. The buyer will be taken to have
exercised his judgment in the selection of the goods described,
3161
A fair application of the proposed Code section would not carve out
any such exception as a rule of law, but rather would categorize
this as an element of fact to be considered by the jury. The of-
ficial comments to the section start with the statement: "Whether or
not this warranty arises in any individual case is basically a question
of fact. .. "
The fact situation present in the Schaffner case is akin to the
problem encountered in the "patent or other trade name" exception
recognized to the particular fitness warranty under the Uniform Sales
Act.' 2 Because of the unfortunate wording of that provision,' 6 '
some cases created an unintended and unnecessary exception to the
that an article sold will answer a particular purpose not contemplated by
the seller."). Erie City Iron Works v. Miller Supply Co., 68 W. Va. 519,
70 S.E. 125 (1911). (No implied warranty of fitness permitted to be shown
where written contract entered into.) Continental Supply Co. v. Stephenson,
94 W. Va. 313, 118 S.E. 537 (1923). ('The plaintiff did not handle the
Roebling lines, but under the urgent request of the defendant, this Roebling
line was shipped to him, billing it to him at the same price it [seller] paid
for it. Now if plaintiff had been shown to have been a dealer in these
Roebling lines, and that it was selling them in the course of business, and
that, it knew the purpose for which the defendant was going to use the
line, an implied warranty would be understood.")
See, Millenson v. Lamp, 99 W. Va. 539, 130 S.E. 137 (1925).
161 80 W. Va. 111 at 121, 42 S.E. 580 at 584.
1
62 
UNIFORM SAL s AcT § 15 (4).
163 "(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article
under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to
its fitness for any particular purpose:'
1962 ]
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warranty of fitness for particular purposes. '64 This Sales Act limita-
tion was created to cover the situation where a buyer ordered an
item by a trade name, since obviously such a buyer would not be
relying on the skill or judgment of the seller, but upon his own
selection. But if the buyer asks the seller, for example, for a paint
remover that will prepare an antique chest for refinishing and the
seller offers and buyer agrees to buy Brand X paint remover, the
buyer is relying on the seller's selection even though the deal is
couched in terms of a trade name. The Code makes no special
reference to the trade name situation in its provision. The comments
however point out that where deals are consummated in terms of
trade or patent names that this is merely one of the fact elements
considered in determining if the buyer is relying on the seller's skill
in selection.' 65
It should be noted that this implied warranty, unlike the one
dealt with in the preceding section, is not limited to merchants. The
comments make this note: "Although normally the warranty will
arise only where the seller is a merchant with the appropriate 'skill
or judgment,' it can arise as to non-merchants where this is justified
by the particular circumstances." '66
Section 2.316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties.
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty
shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other;
but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic
evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the
extent that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
16 4 VoLD, SALES § 90 (2d ed. 1959): "A problem of application [of
the patent or trade name exception] . . . has often given rise to sharp con-
troversy. The buyer may make known to the seller the purpose which goods
are wanted. The seller thereupon may recommend goods identified by patent
or trade-name. The buyer then orders such goods on that recommendation.
Many cases have held that under such circumstances there is no warranty
of suitability; the transaction has been classified as one to which the special
rule [patent or trade-name exception] applies. More carefully analyzed,
however, such situations are readily seen not to involve this special rule at all.
The patent or trade-name may be used as the convenient way in which to
identify the goods."
165 U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 5.
166 Id. Comment 4.
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mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous,
and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclu-
sion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all
implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that
"There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on
the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is",
"with all faults" or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the ex-
clusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully
as he desired or has refused to examine the goods
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects
which an examination ought in the circumstances to
have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified
by course of dealing or course of performance or usage
of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of
damages and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718
and 2-719).
Disclaimers have posed some of the most vexing problems in
sales law. Present West Virginia law is barren of authority in this
much litigated area. 6 ' The adoption of the Code provision at this
point will do little to illuminate the darkness left by the void in the
law of this state. The noble intent of the drafters of the Code was
blunted by the criticisms of the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion study of the 1952 draft of the Code, and the revision of the
167 See, Note, 63 W. VA. L. Rav. 326, 329-31 (1961).
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provision in response to that criticism has been obscurity. 6 ' Sub-
section (1) is probably the most befuddling in the entire sales article.
It attempts to deal with the exclusion of express warranties. Sub-
section (2) and (3) are more meaningful and set up more under-
standable guides for the requirements of valid disclaimers of implied
warranties. Subsection (4) makes it clear that the Code draws a
distinction between the rules regulating the avoidance of the creation
of warranty and those applicable to limiting the remedies for war-
ranties given.
Subsection (1) says that express warranties and disclaimer
language should be construed as consistent when reasonable-and
when not reasonable, the disclaimer must give way to the express
warranty subject to the Code provision on parol evidence. A typical
form of difficulty arises in the clash of a parol warranty which is
disclaimed in a written contract. If the disclaimer is not sufficiently
broad to negate clearly the oral warranty the Code provision de-
mands that they be construed as consistent. But if the disclaimer
is sufficiently broad to prevent them to be reasonably construed to-
gether, the written disclaimer will predominate over the parol war-
ranty. The parol evidence rule of the Code bars introduction of
evidence which is not consistent with the writing or which contra-
168 The provision on disclaimer of express warranties in the 1952 draft
'of the Code reads as follows: "If the agreement creates an express warranty,
words disclaiming it are inoperative." The variety of comments on the
revision of this provision as it appears in the current 1958 text of the Code
is interesting.
(1) From Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the
California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 281, 310 (1961);
"Its language says nothing; it means nothing. In effect, section 2-316(1)
re-enacts the Sales Act coverage of exclusion and modification-which was
nonexistent. The matter is still in the lap of the courts, who are free to
take this language and do what they will; . . "'
(2) From HAwKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 46 (1958): "One other
aspect of the effect of 2-316(1) is worth noting. Affirmations of fact made
by the seller during a bargain usually become part of the contract sub-
sequently formed, and, in the past, the seller's legal department, by using
appropriate disclaimer provisions in preparing the final contract, has been
able to protect the seller from the over-enthusiastic affirmations of fact or
promise... made by his sales force in negotiating the deal. This protection
is withdrawn by subsection 2-316(1), and the seller's legal department should
advise the seller to educate his salesman not to make factual affirmations or
promis-s which cannot be kept.. .."
(3) From Note, 49 Ky. L.J. 240, 252-53 (1960): "[A]Ithough the
'disclaimer' is ineffective as against express warranties contained in the agree-
ment, an 'entirety' clause stating that the contract contains all the terms
agreed upon will effectively prevent claims of other express warranties made
orally prior to the writing. The parol evidence rule contained in the Code
is consistent with Kentucky decisions [viz., that patrol warranties cannot be
shown when a written contract contains a general disclaimer clause]. ..
[ Vol. 64
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diets the writing. It would seem clear that subjecting the latter
portion of subsection (1) of the present disclaimer provision to the
parol evidence rule permits express oral warranties to be effectively
excluded. While this permits the buyer to be surprised by unread
and unbargained for disclaimers, the buyer is given substantial pro-
tection by the implied warranties of the Code and the more stringent
requirements set up for their disclaimer in subsection (2) and (3).
The seller who wishes to protect himself from unwarranted com-
mitments by overzealous sales agents is still afforded an opportunity
to protect himself.
Subsection (2) sets up general standards for the disclaimer of
implied warranties to cover situations not expressly covered by sub-
section (3). The two major classifications of implied warranty are
treated differently. Disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchanta-
bility must (a) mention merchantability and (b) be conspicuous if
the contract is in writing. The Code is not clear (nor do the com-
ments help) as to what is meant by "a writing." Two interpretations
are plausible: (1) If any part of the deal is reduced to writing,
then the disclaimer of merchantability must be in writing, and con-
spicuous; (2) If the disclaimer is written, then it must be conspicu-
ous. If the latter course is followed, a seller could maintain an oral
disclaimer of merchantability though some of the terms were reduced
to writing, e.g. price and quantity. If the first interpretation is
adopted, the seller could not maintain his oral disclaimer of mer-
chantability.
The requirements for effective disclaimer of the implied war-
ranty of fitness' is more specific. It, in every case, must be written
and conspicuous.
The Code gives a fairly precise guide as to what is "conspicuous."
Section 1-201 (1) in the general article of the Code provides, in
part that "Language in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if it is
in larger or other contrasting type or color."
Subsection (3) deals with three specific situations in which
implied warranties are excluded or modified, without following the
standards of subsection (2). Subsection (3) (a) provides an ex-
ception to the mechanical standards adopted in the preceeding sub-
169[t is clear that the Code here refers to the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose created by section 2-315, not to the war-
ranty of fitness for general purpose created by section 2-314 as one facet
of the general warranty of merchantability.
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section with recognition of the "as is" sale as a sale where the
buyer justly stands the risk of quality defects. Thus if a used car
dealer sets off certain of his stock to be sold on an "as is" basis, he
can sell without bearing the risk of merchantability and without
making his disclaimer "conspicuous" in a written memorandum of
sale.
Subsection (3) (b) incorporates what is left of the doctrine of
caveat emptore. Recall at this point however that the principle
implied warranties recognized under the Code are the warranties of
merchantability, and such arise only on sales by merchants dealing
in goods of the kind involved in the transaction. Thus today, as
a century ago, if A, who is not a merchant dealing in horses, sells
his horse to B, B still takes the risk of the horse being blind or
being unsound. But when the average housewife buys a vacuum
cleaner at a department store, she need not retreat to one of those
rare carpeted areas to test its suction in order to avoid the risk
of being saddled with a machine not fit for its ordinary purposes.
But where an examination is made, the buyer is held bound to
observe any defects which "an examination ought in the circum-
stances to have revealed to him. . . ." One West Virginia case is
relevant here. In Showalter v. Chambers7 ' a merchant buyer made
an offer to purchase a carload of hay which he had previously re-
jected as not being of the quality originally ordered. Upon unloading
the hay, the buyer claimed that even poorer quality hay filled the
bulk of the car and that a small portion of medium quality hay had
been loaded at the opening of the car. The court held in that case
that as a matter of law the buyer couldn't complain since he had
inspected all he wanted and was under no obligation to make an
offer. The Code would encourage, but not demand, a different result.
What the examination "ought in the circumstances to have revealed"
would be a question of fact. Under the circumstances of the Sho-
walter case, it is at least arguable that the buyer was not bound to
know of large quantities of rotten hay discoverable only upon re-
moval of a substantial portion of hay from the car. A buyer is not
bound, of course, to discover latent defects.' 7 1
A second point on exclusion or modification of implied war-
ranty by the buyer's examination should be stressed. The Code
uses terminology of "has refused to examine" to indicate that a
170 77 W. Va. 720, 88 S.E. 1072 (1916).
171 See, U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8.
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buyer who is requested and refuses to examine loses the benefit of
implied warranties as to defects which his examination would have
revealed. The commentaries to the section make it clear that the
mere fact that the goods are available for inspection and the buyer
fails (as opposed to refuses) to inspect does not exclude implied
warranties as to defects which an examination would have revealed.,
72
The seller must request the inspection in order to put the buyer on
notice that the buyer must take the risk of observable defects.
Subsection (c) permits implied warranties to be excluded or
modified by usage of trade and the like. An example of this might
be found in used car auctions attended principally by dealers in
used cars where the understanding is common that cars are sold "as
is" and the buyer takes the risks of latent mechanical defects.
Subsection (4) segregates for separate consideration of limiting
remedies for breach of warranty which is dealt with elsewhere in
the Code. The distinction is thus made between creating warranties
and placing limits on the remedies available for those warranties
which do arise in a given sales transaction.
Section 2-317. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties Express or
Implied.
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as
consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction
is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine which
warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the following
rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an incon-
sistent sample or model or general language of de-
scription.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent
general language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied war-
ranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose.
This provision continues and elaborates upon the concept of
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warranty does not negative consistent implied warranties. This view
was acknowledged and accepted by the West Virginia Supreme Court
in Hill & Gain v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 173 The court held in
the Hill & Gain case that a guarantee of general satisfaction amounted
to a sale or return transaction and negated any implied warranties.
At first blush, this seems inconsistent with the Code provision here
under consideration. It is entirely possible that a flaw could de-
velop in the item sold which would be covered by an implied war-
ranty of merchantability but which would not arise until after the
period during which the return option survived. For example, sup-
pose a person buys a room air conditioner on a sale or return
agreement with no time limit on return being specified, and that
after two months of normal and satisfactory operation, the machine
breaks down requiring substantial and expensive repairs. It would
seem that a period of two months would be more than adequate
for a fair trial of the air conditioner and the return option should
have expired. But it would seem true also that such a machine,
to be reasonably fit for its ordinary use, should operate without
such substantial mechanical failure for more than a mere two months.
What result in West Virginia? Hill & Gain says the buyer has a
reasonable time after discovery of the defect to return the item and
recover the purchase price. Since this option of return runs for an
indefinite period of time, it is properly held inconsistent with implied
warranties. The return option would be more limited under the
Code provision, section 2-327 (1) (b), and thus the mere fact
that the transaction involved a sale or return would not negate
implied warranties under the Code.
It should be noted that the rules established under subsections
(a), (b) and (c) are not absolute but are guides to the determina-
tion of the predominating warranty unless circumstances show an-
other result to be more plausible. The rules are aimed at emphasiz-
ing that "which probably claimed the attention of the parties in
the first instance.'" 4
173 121 W. Va. 544, 4 S.E.2d 793 (1939).
1
74 U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 3. The only other West Virginia case
which posed a fact situation in which the cumulation or conflict of war-
ranties may have been involved was American Canning Co. v. Flat Top
Grocery Co., 68 W. Va. 698, 70 S.E. 756 (1910) where buyer attempted
to show a breach of a warranty of sample and the seller relied upon an
express warranty written in the sales contract. The court held that the
sample warranty could not be shown since it would amount to a violation
of the parol evidence rule.
[ Vol. 64
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Section 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or
ImpHed.
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
West Virginia has never specifically decided a case contrary to
the present section,' 75 but the supreme court in Burgess v. Sanitary
Meat Market'7 6 indicated that such a contrary rule would be rec-
ognized if the case arose. The court said there:
"Of course, a food seller's implied warranty does not inure
to the benefit of parties other than the purchaser .... How-
ever, the circumstances of the instant sale do not bring this
plaintiff within the rule barring recovery. Here, plaintiff and
his sons went together to the defendant's meat market and
there the ham was purchased in plaintiff's presence with plain-
tiff's money and taken home by plaintiff himself. To preclude
this plaintiff from his right of recovery, simply because plain-
tiffs son asked for the ham and took the package from de-
fendant's clerk, hardly seems consonant with sound reasoning.
9)177
The present section negates the privity concept in a significant way.
And the official comments note, "Beyond this, the section is neutral
1
75 
If it were not for the Burgess case discussed in the text above, an
argument that West Virginia has recognized some loosening of the privity
requirement could be made on the basis of Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel
Co., 117 W. Va. 680, 186 S.E. 610 (1936). That case established the sealed
container exception to the implied warranty doctrine in this state and com-
pletely ignored the possibility of disposing of the case on the privity
basis. The purchase in that case was made by a "servant of the household"
and the person injured was a child-member of the household. The Burgess
case, however, clearly states that only the purchaser is protected, though
the facts there indicate that other members of the plaintiff's family suffered
from eating the contaminated product. If it were to be assumed that the
court in Pennington consciously ignored the privity issue then privity would
take on an anomolous shape in this state. There seems to be no sense in
a distinction which would say that a servant who purchases for a family
is the "agent" of the entire household, but a member of the family who
shops for the family buys for himself alone and is not an agent for the
other members who rely upon his purchases. But there seems to be no other
distinction, save the fact that the court could reach a decision in favor of
the defendant in Pennington without having to rely upon a ludicrous ap-
plication of the privity doctrine.
176 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939).
1
7 7 Id. at 611, 5 S.E.2d at 787.
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and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law
on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells,
extend to other persons in the distributive chain.' ' 78 This comment
says that the Code takes no position on such situations as those
which arose in Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,' 9 an Ohio
decision of 1958 which ruled a consumer could recover on an
express warranty theory against the manufacturer on the basis of
express affirmations in advertisements of the manufacturer concern-
ing the product which caused the damage, and Henningsen v. Broom-
field Motors Inc., 8 which recognized an implied warranty by an
automobile manufacturer to a member of the household of the
purchaser.
The final sentence of the present provision bars exclusion of
limitation of the effect of the present section, not of warranties in
general. This does not mean that though a merchant may exclude
or limit his warranties as to the purchaser he may not similarly
exclude them as to members of his household, etc., as are explicitly
brought within warranty protection by this section. If a merchant
effectively excludes all warranties in the sale of a given item, there
are no warranties running to members of the household, etc., of the
purchaser. But if any warranty does not arise in connection with
the sale, it must run at least to those covered by this section.'8 '
Section 2-319. F.O.B. and F.A.S. Terms.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed the term F.O.B. (which means
"free on board") at a named place, even though used only in con-
nection with the stated price, is a delivery term under which
(a) when the term is F.O.B. the place of shipment, the
seller must at that place ship the goods in the manner
178 U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 3. Judge Kenna's concurring opinion in
the Burgess case, supra, Note 176, at 611, 6 S.E.2d at 254, noted that while
he approved the ruling there recognizing an implied warranty on the part
of the merchant, that this created an anomolous situation as the manu-
facturer's liability under West Virginia law was determined upon negligence.
Thus strict liability attaches to the retainer, who is less likely to actually be
responsible for the wrong, while only negligence liability attaches to the
manufacturer, who is more likely to have been -in a position to prevent the
harm.
179 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
180 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). The court also held void as against public
policy a limitation upon warranty liability to replacement of parts defectively
manufactured.
181 U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 1.
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provided in this Article (Section 2-504) and bear the
expense and risk of putting them into the possession
of the carrier; or
(b) when the term is F.O.B. the place of destination, the
seller must at his own expense and risk transport the
goods to that place and there tender delivery of them
in the manner provided in this Article (Section 2-503);
(c) when under either (a) or (b) the term is also F.O.B.
vessel, car or other vehicle, the seller must in addition
at his own expense and risk load the goods on board.
If the term is F.O.B. vessel the buyer must name the
vessel and in an appropriate case the seller must com-
ply with the provisions of this Article on the form of
bill of lading (Section 2-323).
(2) Unless otherwise agreed the term F.A.S. vessel (which
means "free alongside") at a named port, even though used only
in connection with the state price, is a delivery term under which
the seller must
(a) at his own expense and risk deliver the goods alongside
the vessel in the manner usual in that port or on a dock
designated and provided by the buyer; and
(b) obtain and tender a receipt for the goods in exchange
for which the carrier is under a duty to issue a bill of
lading.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed in any case falling within sub-
section (1) (a) or (c) or subsection (2) the buyer must seasonably
give any needed instructions for making delivery, including when
the term is F.A.S. or F.O.B. the loading berth of the vessel and in
an appropriate case its name and sailing date. The seller may treat
the failure of needed instructions as a failure of cooperation under
this Article (Section 2-311). He may also at his option move the
goods in any reasonable manner preparatory to delivery or shipment.
(4) Under the term F.O.B. vessel or F.A.S. unless otherwise
agreed the buyer must make payment against tender of the required
documents and the seller may not tender nor the buyer demand
delivery of the goods in substitution for the documents.
This provision makes it clear that the terms F.O.B. and F.A.S.
are delivery terms and not mere price terms. In addition, the section
19621
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spells out in detail the division of responsibilities of the buyer and
seller when such terms are used in a sales agreement. It should
be noted that this is another "unless otherwise agreed" provision
of the Code and its rules apply only where the agreement, made
either explicitly or implicitly as by course of dealing, do not attach
a different meaning to the terms. By and large, West Virginia
case law has recognized F.O.B. as a delivery term..2 though there
is one case which casts some doubt on this view. In Back & Greiwe
v. Smith.. 3 the court noted that usually F.O.B. place of shipment
means that the goods are "delivered" when given to the shipper,
but it refused to recognize the rule in that case because the seller
had the goods consigned to himself, thus shipping under reservation.
West Virginia has recognized the right of a seller to stop goods in
transit," 4 thus there exists the potential power to prevent tender
after delivery without use of the consignment-to-seller technique. It
seems clear that the court refused to recognize as the F.O.B. term
as a delivery term in that particular instance.
The more detailed obligations which are incurred by buyer
and seller under the use of the terms F.O.B. and F.A.S. would fill
an area that is presently a void in West Virginia Law.
Section 2-320. C.I.F. and C. & F. Terms.
(1) The term C.I.F. means that the price includes in a lump
sum the cost of the goods and the insurance and freight to the named
destination. The term C. & F. or C.F. means that the price so
includes cost and freight to the named destination.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed and even though used only in
connection with the stated price and destination, the term C.I.F.
destination or its equivalent requires the seller at his own expense
and risk to
(a) put the goods into the possession of a carrier at the
port for shipment and obtain a negotiable bill or bills
'82 NWholesale Coal Co. v. Price Hill Colliery Co., 98 W. Va. 438, 128
S.E. 313 (1925); Vaccaro Bros. & Co. v. Farris, 92 W. Va. 655, 115 S.E.
830 (1923); Wiggin v. Marsh Lumber Co., 77 W. Va. 7, 87 S.E. 194 (1915).
183 66 W. Va. 47, 66 S.E. 1 (1909). The buyer in this case refused to
accept the goods tendered because of substantial damage which apparently
resulted during shipment. Had the F.O.B. term been held a term of delivery,
the risk of loss during transit would have fallen upon the buyer. Note that
under section 2-310 of the Code a seller may ship under reservation unless
otherwise agreed, and section 2-509 the risk of loss falls on the buyer when
the goods are shipped, even though shipped under reservation.
184 Sharp v. Campbell, 89 W. Va. 526, 109 S.E. 611 (1921).
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of lading covering the entire transportation to the
named destination; and
(b) load the goods and obtain a receipt from the carrier
(which may be contained in the bill of lading) showing
that the freight has been paid or provided for; and
(c) obtain a policy or certificate of insurance, including
any war risk insurance, of a kind and on terms then
current at the port of shipment in the usual amount,
in the currency of the contract, shown to cover the
same goods covered by the bill of lading and providing
for payment of loss to the order of the buyer or for
the account of whom it may concern; but the seller
may add to the price the amount of the premium for
any such war risk insurance; and
(d) prepare an invoice of the goods and procure any other
documents required to effect shipment or to comply
with the contract; and
(e) forward and tender with commercial promptness all
the documents in due form and with any indorsement
necessary to perfect the buyer's rights.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed the term C. &. F. or its equivalent
has the same effect and imposes upon the seller the same obligations
and risks as a C.I.F. term except the obligation as to insurance.
(4) Under the term C.I.F. or C. & F. unless otherwise agreed
the buyer must make payment against tender of the required docu-
ments and the seller may not tender nor the buyer demand delivery
of the goods in substitution for the documents.
No West Virginia cases were found dealing with C.I.F. or C. & F.
terms in sales contracts. This provision codifies and clarifies for
the most part the case law which has developed around the use
of the C.I.F. contract, but some minor changes have been made.
The basic idea of the C.I.F. term is that the seller delivers the
goods, and thus passes the risk of loss, to the buyer upon delivery
to the carrier-normally a vessel for overseas shipment in C.I.F.
contracts-and deals in terms of a price which includes the cost
of the goods, plus the cost of the insurance covering the goods
1962 ]
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during shipment and the cost of the freight. One change brought
about the Code provision is the added requirement that the shipper-
seller obtain war risk insurance "then current at the port of ship-
ment . . ." a form of insurance that is not usually contemplated
by the C.I.F. contract presently.
' as
Section 2-321. CJ.F. or C. & F.: "Net Landed Weights"; "Pay-
ment on Arrival"; Warranty of Condition on Arrival.
Under a contract containing a term C.I.F. or C. & F.
(1) Where the price is based on or is to be adjusted according
to "net landed weights", "delivered weights", "out turn" quantity or
quality or the like, unless otherwise agreed the seller must reasonably
estimate the price. The payment due on tender of the documents
called for by the contract is the amount so estimated, but after final
adjustment of the price a settlement must be made with commercial
promptness.
(2) An agreement described in subsection (1) or any warranty
of quality or condition of the goods on arrival places upon the seller
the risk of ordinary deterioration, shrinkage and the like in transpor-
tation but has no effect on the place or time of identification to the
contract for sale or delivery or on the passing of the risk of loss.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed where the contract provides for
payment on or after arrival of the goods the seller must before pay-
ment allow such preliminary inspection as is feasible; but if the
goods are lost delivery of the documents and payment are due when
the goods should have arrived."
This section elaborates upon variations under the typical C.I.F.
and C. & F. contract where the risk of deterioration or shrinkage
during transportation is borne by the seller. However, where net
landed weight or delivered weight or similar terms are used in con-
nection with C.I.F., the risk of marine loss still falls upon the
buyer and only the loss of ordinary deterioration during shipment
falls on the buyer. Again, there is no West Virginia authority
bearing upon such questions.
85 Smith Co. Ltd., v. Marano, 267 Pa. 107, 110 AtI. 94 (1920) is a
leading case on C.I.F. contracts. The goods were shipped C.I.F. but lost
at sea as a result of submarine warfare and the buyer was held to stand
the risk of loss.
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Section 2-322. Delivery "Ex-Ship".
(1) Unless otherwise agreed a term for delivery of goods "ex-
ship" (which means from the carrying vessel) or in equivalent lan-
guage is not restricted to a particular ship and requires delivery from
a ship which has reached a place at the named port of destination
where goods of the kind are usually discharged.
(2) Under such a term unless otherwise agreed
(a) the seller must discharge all liens arising out of the
carriage and furnish the buyer with a direction which
puts the carrier under a duty to deliver the goods; and
(b) the risk of loss does not pass to the buyer until the
goods leave the ship's tackle or are otherwise properly
unloaded.
This provision elaborates upon the term "ex-ship" which is
the commercial opposite of C.I.F. in that the risk of loss, including
marine risks during transit, is upon the seller. It is somewhat the
overseas shipment parallel to the F.O.B. destination contract on an
overland shipment save that in an "ex-ship" contract the risk shifts
at the unloading, while in the F.O.B. destination contract the risk
passes upon tender of the goods at the destination even though they
may still be in possession of the carrier."8 6
Section 2-323. Form of Bill of Lading Required in Overseas
Shipment; "Overseas".
(1) Where the contract contemplates overseas shipment and
contains a term C.I.F. or C. & F. or F.O.B. vessel, the seller unless
otherwise agreed must obtain a negotiable bill of lading stating that
the goods have been loaded on board or, in the case of a term C.T.F.
or C & F., received for shipment.
(2) Where in a case within subsection (1) a bill of lading has
been issued in a set of parts, unless otherwise agreed if the documents
are not to be sent from abroad the buyer may demand tender of the
full set; otherwise only one part of the bill of lading need be tendered.
Even if the agreement expressly requires a full set
11
6 See section 2-509.
1962]
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(a) due tender of a single part is acceptable within the pro-
visions of this Article on cure of improper delivery
(subsection (1) of Section 2-508); and
(b) even though the full set is demanded, if the documents
are sent from abroad the person tendering an incom-
plete set may nevertheless require payment upon fur-
nishing an indemnity which the buyer in good faith
deems adequate.
(3) A shipment by water or by air or a contract contemplating
such shipment is "overseas" insofar as by usage of trade or agreement
it is subject to the commercial, financing or shipping practices
characteristic of internation deep water commerce.
Again, no West Virginia authority is involved. This section
generally distinguishes the C.I.F. contract where a named vessel is
involved, where the bill of lading must show the goods to be loaded,
as against a C.I.F. contract which does not designate a vessel in
which the bill of lading need only show the goods to have been
received for shipment. Subsection (2) recognizes the general com-
mercial practice of requiring an acceptance of a part set of bills
issued in a set where the person tendering the part set provides for
indemnification for losses which might result from a failure to present
the full set. This practice is discussed in Dixon, Irmaos & Cia v.
Chase Nat'l Bank.18
Section 2-324. "No Arrival, No Sale" Term.
Under a term "no arrival, no sale" or terms of like meaning,
unless otherwise agreed,
(a) the seller must properly ship conforming goods and
if they arrive by any means he must tender them on
arrival but he assumes no obligation that the goods will
arrive unless he has caused the non-arrival; and
(b) where without fault of the seller the goods are in part
lost or have so deteriorated as no longer to conform
to the contract or arrive after the contract time, the
buyer may proceed as if there had been casualty to
identified goods (Section 2-613).
187 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944).
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No West Virginia authority is involved. This basically recognizes
another variation in allocation of risks in regard to overseas ship-
ments where the seller bears risk of loss during shipment, but negates
his liability to a buyer where the shipment does not arrive and the
seller is not responsible for its failure to arrive.
Section 2-325. "Letter of Credit" Term; "Confirmed Credit".
(1) Failure of the buyer seasonably to furnish an agreed letter
of credit is a breach of the contract for sale.
(2) The delivery to seller of a proper letter of credit suspends
the buyer's obligation to pay. If the letter of credit is dishonored, the
seller may on seasonable notification to the buyer require payment
directly from him.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed the term "letter of credit" or
"banker's credit" in a contract for sale means an irrevocable credit
issued by a financing agency of good repute and, where the shipment
is overseas, of good international repute. The term "confirmed
credit" means that the credit must also carry the direct obligation of
such an agency which does business in the seller's financial market.
No West Virginia authority is involved. This section rounds
out a series of provisions starting with section 2-319 which are
aimed at fixing the meanings of numerous common commercial
terms and abbreviations.
Section 2-326. Sale on Approval and Sale or Return; Consignment
Sales and Rights of Creditors.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, if delivered goods may be re-
turned by the buyer even though they conform to the contract, the
transaction is
(a) a "sale on approval" if the goods are delivered pri-
marily for use, and
(b) a "sale or return" if the good are delivered primarily
for resale.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), goods held on ap-
proval are not subject to the claims of the buyer's creditors until
19621
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acceptance; goods held on sale or return are subject to such claims
while in the buyer's possession.
(3) Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such
person maintains a place of business at which he deals in goods of
the kind involved, under a name other than the name of the person
making delivery, then with respect to claims of creditors of the
person conducting the business the goods are deemed to be on sale
or return. The provisions of this subsection are applicable even
though an agreement purports to reserve title to the person making
delivery until payment or resale or uses such words as "on consign-
ment" or "on memorandum". However, this subsection is not
applicable if the person making delivery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a con-
signor's interest or the like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is
generally known by his creditors to be substantially
engaged in selling the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Article on
Secured Transactions (Article 9).
(4) Any "or return" term of a contract for sale is to be treated
as a separate contract for sale within the statute of frauds section of
this Article (Section 2-201) and as contradicting the sale aspect of
the contract within the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic
evidence (Section 2-202).
Some West Virginia cases have dealt with sale on approval and
sale or return transactions, but none have clearly distinguished the
two. In addition to clarifying this distinction, the Code would make
some changes in the rights of creditors under its provisions relating
to the sale or return transaction.
West Virginia cases tend to lump sale or return and sale on
approval into a single category in which the return privilege is
viewed basically as a means of affording the buyer an added op-
portunity to determine quality or suitability of the goods involved.
Osborne & Co. v. Francis"' is the only case which seriously at-
tempted a distinction between the two kinds of transactions, and
188 38 W. Va. 312, 18 S.E. 591 (1893). (Transaction involving a sale
for use of a farm machine.)
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the distinction there offered was that a sale on approval permitted
the buyer to return conforming goods for any reason, no matter
how arbitrary, while the sale or return was held to demand the
exercise of reasonable judgment by the buyer."8 9 Subsequent cases
have pretty well ignored this proferred distinction.'90 No West Vir-
ginia case has clearly recognized the "or return" provision as a
means of shifting financing burdens or business risks. The Code
makes a sensible distinction here, and avoids the common law's
awkward concern for intent and title.19'
Recognizing the sale or return as a credit mechanism, the Code
establishes in subsection (2) the general principle that goods held
by the buyer under a sale or return arrangement are subject to
the claims of the buyer's creditors. This accords generally with
the West Virginia Trader's Act,'92 which has long provided a measure
of protection to creditors who deal with a merchant who deals in
189There is a good bit of case law on the question of whether a "sale
on approval" where satisfaction of the buyer is involved amounts to a
contract or a sale at all since a promise to accept if satisfactory may be
illusory. Some courts have strained to read into these contracts standards
of reasonableness. See generally, 1 WiLLISTON, SALEs §§ 191, 191a (rev.
ed. 1948). The Code comments to the present section (comment 1) rec-
ognize the buyer's agreement to receive and test as consideration for the
seller's delivery and agreement to sell, but takes no position the diversity
of opinion as regards automatic application of a test of reasonable satisfaction
where an industrial machine is involved.
190 Hill & Gain v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 W. Va. 554, 4 S.E.2d
793 (1939). (Court held a "guarantee bond" to constitute the transaction
a "sale or return" with an "unqualified right to return" in the buyer. This
was a sale for use and there was no mention, apparently, in the consumma-
tion of the sale of the words "sale on approval" or "sale or return" The
ruling conforms to the general principle that no special form of words are
necessary to constitute a sale or return or sale on approval contract.);
George DeWitt Shoe Co. v. Adkins, 83 W. Va. 267, 98 S.E. 209 (1919).
(Entrusting of goods for resale, buyer claiming return privilege. Court treats
this as a sale where approval of the fitness of the product involved is the
issue, and denied the buyer's right to return on a combination of the
buyer's failure to promptly return after it had an opportunity to determine
suitability of product for sale and an agents presumed inability to give
return privilege for more than a reasonable time. This disposition of the
case ignores the possibility that the sale or return transaction may not in-
volve a question of "satisfaction" at all but may be used as a device to
shift business risks away from the retailer and back towards the producer.);
Ohio River Contract Co. v. Smith, 76 W. Va. 503, 85 S.E. 671 (1915). (A
sale for use, court intimating that a reasonable determination of suitability
or fitness was involved, though the case did not turn on this point. See
further discussion of this case under the annotations to the following section
of the Code.)
191 2 WLLISTON, SALES § 270 (rev. ed. 1948).
1
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stock owned by someone other than himself.'93 Subsection (3) of
the Code provisions sets up certain exceptions to the general prin-
ciple of subsection (2) and here there are some conflicts between
the policies of the Code provision and those of the Trader's Act.
Subsection (3) (a) contemplates the sign requirement estab-
lished by section 1 of the Trader's Act, but subsection (3) (b) con-
flicts with that act. Subsection (3) (b) says goods held by a
merchant on a sale or return basis are not subject to the claims
of his creditors if he is generally known to be engaged in selling
the goods of others. It has been held in West Virginia that the
creditor's knowledge that the merchant was dealing in goods owned
by another was immaterial where the notice provisions of the Trader's
Act were not complied with.'94 Subsection (3) (c) excepts from
the general rule of section (2) the interests of a seller who has
complied with the filing provisions of Article 9 of the Code. This
parallels to a degree the exception under the Trader's Act added in
1933' 9' which recognizes that the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
filing requirements provided adequate notice to creditors where the
conditional sale technique was employed as a means of inventory
or equipment financing.
As a part of the integration of the Code as a whole into
West Virginia law, the wisdom of retaining the Trader's Act in
its present form will be considered. Article 9 of the Code com-
prehensively deals with the problems of chattel security and no
doubt a significant change in the Trader's Act would be advisable
to correlate it with the Code provisions.
Subsection (4) of the Code codifies the rule of Braude & Mc-
Donnel, Inc. v. Isadore Cohen Co.,' 96 to the effect that an oral "or
return" agreement conflicts with a writing which evidences a sale
absolute upon its face.' 97
'9 3 The Trader's Act is aimed generally at any person engaged in the
business of buying and selling where the ownership of the stock or some
of it involved in such sales is owned by someone other than the person en-
gaged in the business. It is thus broader in its scope than the present Code
section which deals with only the sale or return situation.
194 Morris v. Clifton Forge Grocery Co., 46 W. Va. 197, 32 S.E. 997
(1899). (Fact that trader had informed agent of creditor that he was dealing
as an agent for a principal who was not disclosed by a sign or by publication
as required by the Trader's Act held immaterial.) Accord, Hoge v. Turner,
96 Va. 624, 32 S.E. 291 (1899).
,95 W. Va. Laws, ch. 52 (1933).
196 87 W. Va. 763, 106 S.E. 52 (1921).
, See discussion of § 2-202.
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Section 2-327. Special Incidents of Sale on Approval and Sale
or Return.
(1) Under a sale on approval unless otherwise agreed
(a) although the goods are identified to the contract the
risk of loss and the title do not pass to the buyer until
acceptance; and
(b) use of the goods consistent with the purpose of trial is
not acceptance but failure seasonably to notify the
seller of election to return the goods is acceptance, and
if the goods conform to the contract acceptance of any
part is acceptance of the whole; and
(c) after due notification of election to return, the return
is at the seller's risk and expense but a merchant
buyer must follow any reasonable instructions.
(2) Under a sale or return unless otherwise agreed
(a) the option to return extends to the whole or any com-
mercial unit of the goods while in substantially their
original condition, but must be exercised seasonably;
and
(b) the return is at the buyer's risk and expense.
West Virginia case law has touched upon some of the issues
resolved by this provision, but in the main the section would resolve
unanswered questions in this state.
The Code pattern for treating these two similar kinds of trans-
actions is further manifested and clarified here. The sale on ap-
proval passes to the seller a risk of satisfying his potential buyer
and affords the buyer an opportunity to check the quality or suit-
ability of the goods while they are in his possession. The sale or
return, contrawise, is treated as a technique for shifting back along
the distributive chain financial burdens or business risks or both.
This distinction is not presently drawn by West Virginia law, and
thus the working out of details manifests the contrast between the
sporadic pattern of West Virginia decisions which furnish little in
the way of a general pattern or theory and the Code which provides
a well defined approach to such sales transactions.
19621
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Three West Virginia cases should be noted in connection with
this provision: Ohio River Contract Co. v. Smith;'98 Osborne &
Co. v. Francis'99 and George DeWitt Shoe Co. v. Adkins."'
In the Ohio Contract Co. case, the buyer, being sued for the
purchase price, maintained that it had agreed to buy on an approval
basis certain material to be used in a construction job and claimed
to be exempt from paying the purchase price because it had dis-
approved the goods tendered. The court ruled that the facts would
not support this position as the buyer had used one-fourth of the
materials tendered, that such extensive use was not consistent with
a mere testing of the goods. The buyer was held to have accepted
the entire lot by such extensive use of goods tendered. This disposi-
tion of the case is consistent with subsection (1) (b) of the present
Code provision.
In the Osborne & Co. case, again involving a sale for use, thus
a sale on approval under the Code theory, the court intimated that
under a sale on approval the return is at the seller's risk and ex-
pense. The court did not specifically rule on the point, but the
buyer refused to accept the machine delivered and tested, and his
defense was held sound. After his test, the buyer notified the seller
of his disapproval and left the machine standing on his farm for the
seller to pick up indicating the risk of return was on the seller.
Thus, the case appears to be in accord with subsection (1) (c).
The George DeWitt Shoe case, however, would probably be
decided differently under the Code. There a merchant buyer took
a stock of shoes for resale with a right of return. The court held
the buyer could not return the shoes remaining in stock seven
198 76 W. Va. 503, 85 S.E. 671 (1915). This case has been cited as
authority for the point that an acceptance of part is acceptance of the
whole in cases where a sale on approval was not involved, e.g. Dixie Ap-
pliance Co. v. Bourne, 138 W. Va. 810, 77 S.E.2d 879 (1953). The Code
makes a distinction between acceptance and approval. Under the Code pro-
vision, unless otherwise agreed, an approval under a sale on approval must
relate to the entire lot of goods involved, but an acceptance, under a normal
sale involving a tender of goods where no "on approval" privilege is ac-
corded, may apply to "commercial units" within the entire lot of goods
tendered. See sections 2-601 and 2-606 and discussions.
The comments to the present section note that there may be two sale
on approval contracts involved in a single transaction: e.g., a woman takes
home two dresses on an "on approval" basis; she is not bound to approve
both or disapprove both, but if she has a suite of furniture delivered on
an "on approval" basis, she may not select out individual pieces to keep
and disapprove the remainder.
199 38 W. Va. 312, 18 S.E. 519 (1893).
200 83 W. Va. 267, 98 S.E. 209 (1919).
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months after delivery as this ran well beyond the time necessary
for a reasonable test of quality and suitability. This views the deal
as a sale on approval, but the Code assumes a delivery of goods
for resale involves a sale or return, not a sale on approval. There
was a substantial dispute in the DeWitt Shoe case as to whether the
right of return was given. The court was very hesitant to find
a sale or return in the Code sense, principally because it doubted
an agent's authority to make such a contract for his principal. The
Code view is that a sale with a return privilege made to another
for resale is presumed to be a sale or return, and less than the entire
amount delivered may be returned. The return under the Code
provision must be seasonable,2"' and what would be a seasonable
return would depend, not upon the time for testing suitability or
fitness, but upon the reasonable time necessary to dispose of the
shoes by resale. Seven months could be a reasonable time here,
depending upon the stocking practices and velocity of stock turn-
over in the retail shoe business involved.
Section 2-328. Sale by Auction.
(1) In a sale by auction if the goods are put up in lots each
lot is the subject of a separate sale.
(2) A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer so an-
nounces by the fall of the hammer or in other customary manner.
Where a bid is made while the hammer is falling in acceptance of
a prior bid the auctioneer may in his discretion reopen the bidding
or declare the goods sold under the bid on which the hammer was
falling.
(3) Such a sale is with reserve unless the goods are in explicit
terms put up without reserve. In an auction with reserve the auction-
eer may withdraw the goods at any time until he announces comple-
tion of the sale. In an auction without reserve, after the auctioneer
calls for bids on an article or lot, that article or lot cannot be with-
drawn unless no bid is made within a reasonable time. In either
case a bidder may retract his bid until the auctioneer's announcement
of completion of the sale, but a bidder's retraction does not revive
any previous bid.
201 "Seasonable" is defined in section 1-204 of the Code in subsection
(3) in the following terms: "An action is taken 'seasonably' when it is
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(4) If the auctioneer knowingly receives a bid on the seller's
behalf or the seller makes or procures such a bid, and notice has
not been given that liberty for such bidding is reserved, the buyer
may at his option avoid the sale or take the goods at the price of
the last good faith bid prior to the completion of the sale. This
subsection shall not apply to any bid at a forced sale.
This provision restates and amplifies generally accepted rules
relating to auction sales with only a few innovations. The generally
accepted view is that an auction sale is "with reserve" unless other-
wise indicated and thus goods put up for sale may be withdrawn
anytime before a bid is accepted.2 2
Subsection (4) gives the bidder who has been prejudiced by
"by-bidding" an option which probably is not available under present
law. The usual effect of such by-bidding is to give the purchaser
whose bid is accepted a privilege to avoid the sale.2 3 The Code in
addition gives him the option of taking the goods at the last good
faith bid.
A seller is permitted to make or procure bids on his property
without risking a right of avoidance in other bidders where the sale
is a forced sale. Where an owner is not voluntarily selling his prop-
erty, he is of course denied the usual methods of protecting him-
self from sales at unduly low prices, such as withdrawing the goods
because bids are not high enough to be acceptable. 4
Section 2-401. Passing of Title; Reservation for Security; Limited
Application of This Section.
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obliga-
tions and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third
parties applies irrespective of title to the goods except where the
provision refers to such title. Insofar as situations are not covered
2 02 
R.STATMNT, CONTRACTS § 27.
203 Peck v. List, 23 W. Va. 338 (1884). See, 5 AM. Jun. Auctions § 23
(1936).
204 There was a time when the chancery courts of England permitted
good faith by-bidding to prevent the sacrifice of property at auction sales.
See, 5 AM. Jun. Auctions § 25 (1936), where Peck v. List, supra note 203,
is misleadingly cited for the proposition that a small minority of American
courts have followed the old English Chancery rule. The exhaustive opinion
by Judge Green in the Peck case notes some American decisions which ap-
parently followed the old English Chancery rule, but that rule is roundly
condemned in Judge Green's opinion.
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by the other provisions of this Article and matters concerning title
become material the following rules apply:
(1) Title to goods cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to
their identification to the contract (Section 2-501), and unless other-
wise explicitly agreed the buyer acquires by their identification a
special property as limited by this Act. Any retention or reservation
by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to
the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.
Subject to these provisions and to the provisions of the Article on
Secured Transactions (Article 9), title to goods passes from the seller
to the buyer in any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed
on by the parties.
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer
at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance
with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any
reservation of a security interest and even though a document of
title is to be delivered at a different time or place; and in particular
and despite any reservation of a security interest by the bill of lading
(a) if the contract requires or authorizes the seller to send
the goods to the buyer but does not require him to
deliver them at destination, title passes to the buyer
at the time and place of shipment; but
(b) if the contract requires delivery at destination, title
passes on tender there.
(3) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed where delivery is to be
made without moving the goods,
(a) if the seller is to deliver a document of title, title
passes at the time when and the place where he delivers
such documents; or
(b) if the goods are at the time of contracting already iden-
tified and no documents are to be delivered, title passes
at the time and place of contracting.
(4) A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to receive or
retain the goods, whether or not justified, or a justified revocation of
acceptance revests title to the goods in the seller. Such revesting
occurs by operation of law and is not a "sale".
The introductory language of this provision emphasizes one of
the key features of the sales article of the Code; the title concept
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of sales is abandoned. This is a major conceptual change in sales
law which would be brought about by the adoption of the Code.
Risk of loss, rights of creditors and such problems are dealt with
directly under the Code, not through the medium of locating an
elusive title. The Uniform Sales Act and the common law, contra-
wise, regarded the location of title as the key to the unraveling of
many such problems." 5 The Code, however, recognizes a lingering
concern for title, and thus the necessity of the substantive portion
of this section. The Code concern for title arises in two instances:
(a) where the Code section specifically refers to title,20 and (b)
in situations not covered by the Code. Subsections (1) and (3)
establish rules for determining the location of title which follow, in
general, familiar guides.
Subsection (1) states, with some qualifications, the general rule
that title may pass whenever the parties explicitly agree. The Uni-
form Sales Act and the common law phrase this principle a bit
differently, not emphasizing the necessity of an explicit agreement.
In other words, present law says that title passes when the parties
intend it to pass and then looks to express agreements or to im-
plications from express agreements or surrounding circumstances to
find the intent of the parties.07 The problem with the approach of
the present law is that in most situations resulting in litigation
there was in fact never any real or actual concern or intent at all
about the passing of title. The "guides" used by the present law
to find a mythical intent fairly well parallel the "rules" stated in
the subsections (2) and (3) of the Code provision. While some
cases stress the matter of intent as a fact question for a jury,208
others seem to treat the "guides" or "gap filling" rules as rules of
2o West Virginia follows traditional common law concepts here. See
Ailes & Goodwin, Some Comments on the Appropriation Tangle in the Law
of Sales, 45 W. VA. L. Q. 319 (1939); Note, Property in the Goods Under
West Virginia Law, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 255 (1958). For the Code change
generally, see Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAw & CON-
TEMP. Pn O. 3 (1951).
206 E.g. § 2-310.
207 Morgan v. King, 28 W. Va. 1 (1886) is the tap root of the doctrine
in West Virginia. The court there said, id., at 14: "The question, whether
a sale of personal property is complete or only executory is to be determined
from the intent of the parties as gathered from their contract, the situation
of the thing sold and the circumstances surrounding the sale."
Accord: Revelle v. McQuay, 85 W. Va. 129, 101 S.E. 76 (1919); Moore
v. Patchin, 71 W. Va. 192, 76 S.E. 426 (1912); Shock v. Gowing, 71 W. Va.
250, 76 S.E. 441 (1912); Bank of Huntington v. Napier, 41 W. Va. 481,
23 S.E. 800 (1895); Hood v. Bloch Bros., 29 W. Va. 244, 11 S.E. 910 (1886).
208 Hood v. Bloch Bros., 29 W. Va. 244, 11 S.E. 910 (1886); Morgan
v. King, 28 W. Va. 1 (1886).
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law which bind the jury, or control the issue." 9 The Code approach
makes more sense and provides that where this intent is not ex-
pressed, then an established set of rules automatically apply.
Recall at this point that the role of title is substantially reduced
under the Code and that most problems resolved on a title basis
under present law are treated directly by specific provisions of the
Code.
The Code's recognition that express agreement may control title
is subject to some qualifications, as it is under present law. First
among these is one dealing with the sale of future goods or ex-
pectancies. Identification is the key under the Code and the Code
provision on identification of goods to a contract of sale, section
2-510, recognizes and clarifies the concept of "potential possession,"
which was the common law answer to this problem."' The sub-
section also notes the distinction between the "special property"
interest which arises in the buyer after identification and the "reserva-
tion of a security interest" in the seller after "title" passes to the
buyer. The "special property" device is employed to give a buyer
some legal protection for his expectancies, such as his right to goods
upon a seller's insolvency under section 2-502. This interest arises
automatically upon identification of goods absent an explicit agree-
ment to the contrary. The security interest of the seller on the
contrary does not arise automatically but requires some affirmative
action by him.
Subsection (2) states the familiar principle that the property
interest in the goods, where the goods are to be shipped to the
buyer, pass upon the seller's delivery to the carrier,"' unless the
seller has undertaken to deliver the goods to a particular destination.
In the latter case, the property interest passes to the buyer upon
tender at that destination." This generally restates principles em-
ployed under common law to locate title. One change would result
under West Virginia law here. Subsection (2) makes it clear that
the reservation of a security interest in the goods does not affect the
209 Revelle v. McQuay, 85 W. Va. 129, 101 S.E. 76 (1919); Black &
Sons v. Johnson & Sons, 65 W. Va. 518, 64 S.E. 626 (1909).
210Wiant v. Hayes, 38 W. Va. 681, 18 S.E. 807 (1893). See, 1 WnLus-
TON, SALES § 133 (rev. ed. 1948); VOLD, SALES § 45 (2d. ed. 1959).
211 E.g. Mullins v. Farris, 100 W. Va. 540, 131 S.E. 6 (1925); Whole-
sale Coal Co. v. Price Hill Colliery Co., 98 W. Va. 438, 128 S.E. 313 (1925).
212 E.g. Bloyd v. M. & J. Pollock, 27 W. Va. 75 (1885).
1962 ]
52
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [1962], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol64/iss2/3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
point at which the title to the goods passes. West Virginia has ruled
to the contrary.
'1 3
Subsection (3) provides rules for the determination of the
passing of title where no shipment is involved, and subsection (4)
provides that a revesting of title upon rejection is not a "sale" but
a revesting by operation of law.
Section 2-402. Rights of Seller's Creditors Against Sold Goods.
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), right of
unsecured creditors of the seller with respect to goods which have
been identified to a contract for sale are subject to the buyer's rights
to recover the goods under this Article (Section 2-502 and 2-716).
(2) A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification
of goods to a contract for sale as void if as against him a retention of
possession by the seller is fraudulent under any rule of law of the
state where the goods are situated, except that retention of possession
in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for
a commercially reasonable time after a sale or identification is not
fraudulent.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights
of creditors of the seller
(a) under the provisions of the Article on Secured Trans-
actions (Article 9); or
(b) where identification to the contract or delivery is made
not in current course of trade but in satisfaction of or
as security for a pre-existing claim for money, security
or the like and is made under circumstances which
under any rules of law of the state where the goods
are situated would apart from this Article constitute
the transaction a fraudulent transfer or voidable pre-
ference.
This section ties up some loose ends. The Code does not attempt
to rewrite the law of fraudulant conveyances as it bears upon the
sale of goods, but it does make it clear that retention of possession
213 Back & Greiwe v. Smith, 66 W. Va. 47, 66 S.E. 1 (1909).
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in the current course of business is legitimate and not fraudulent.
This no doubt accords with present West Virginia policy. 14
The rights of a buyer before he has possession of the goods,
created by Section 2-502 (dealing with an advance payment and
subsequent insolvency of seller) and 2-716 (dealing with buyer's
right to specific performance) are subjected to the existing law of
fraudulent conveyances. Subsection (3) makes it clear that rights
of creditors created under article 9 prevail over rights arising under
the sales article and emphasizes the limits on the subsection (2)
exception of retention in "current course of business."
Section 2-403. Power to Transfer; Good Faith Purchase of Goods;
"Entrusting".
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor
had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited
interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased.
A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a
good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered
under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even
through
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the pur-
chaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later
dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash
sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as
larcenous under the criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of
the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business.
214 In Poling v. Flanagan, 41 W. Va. 191, 194, 23 S.E. 685, 686 (1895)
the court said: "The rule that the retention of possession of a chattel by
the seller after absolute sale is per se fraud . . . rendering the sale void
as to subsequent purchasers and creditors of the seller, does not prevail
here, but it is prima facie evidence of fraud, and will overthrow the sale
as purchasers and creditors unless circumstances of good faith are shown
by the purchaser. . . ." Commercially reasonable retention in the ordinary
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(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in
retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between
the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether
the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of
the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law.
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors
are governed by the Articles of Secured Transactions (Article 9),
Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7).
This provision would enlarge the protection given to good
faith purchasers and to those who buy in the ordinary course of
business. Those situations not covered more specifically by Code
provisions mentioned in subsection (4), relating to bulk sales, se-
cured transactions and document of title cases, are lumped together
in this general provision. The general policy underlying this pro-
vision has been stated with conciseness by Vold:
"[T]he original defrauded seller and the good faith purchaser
from the fraudulent buyer are usually equally meritorious.
Favoring here the innocent purchaser tends to promote negotia-
bility of goods. This in turn tends to promote security of
transaction: in other words, stability of deals and certainty
in contract relations. These tend, at least prima facie, to pro-
mote the general welfare by securing the maximum fulfillment
of human wants."
2'S
Needless to say, the more security that is placed in transactions, the
less security there remains in pre-existing property rights.
Present West Virginia law is ambivalent in this area, though it
tends to emphasize less than the Code provision the desirability
of the security of transactions. The West Virginia court has on
several occasions repeated the statement that one cannot pass any
better title than he has himself. But such statements are qualified
by the phrase "in general" no doubt out of recognition of the void-
able title situation.
Subsections (1) (a) to (1) (d) deal generally with situations
in which it has occasionally been held that the good faith purchaser
could not claim a superior right in the property as against the original
2 1 5 VOLD, SALEs § 79 (2d ed. 1959).
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owner.2"' None of these precise questions are posed directly in West
Virginia cases, though it is interesting to note in relation to subsec-
tions (1) (b) and (1) (d) the recent case of Holt Motor Co. v.
Casto.2 17 There the absconding middleman had obtained an auto-
mobile by use of a no fund check in Virginia and then sold the
car to a West Virginia buyer. The court characterized the original
obtaining of the car as criminal, but ultimately resolved the case
on what it held to be the absence of good faith on the part of the
West Virginia buyer. Thus, inferentially, West Virginia is in accord
with subsection (1) (b) and arguably with subsection (1) (d).
Subsections (2) and (3) run contrary to a 1903 decision of
the West Virginia court, but they are in accord with some uniform
acts adopted in this state subsequent to that decision. In Ullman,
Einsetein & Co. v. Biddle Bros.,21 the original owner entrusted
merchandise in the hands of a merchant and recovered it from the
merchant's purchaser. The court hinted broadly at circumstances
showing an absence of good faith on the part of the purchaser but
resolved the case by the original recognition of this state of the
maxim of Nemo dat quod no habit-you can't sell what you don't
own. "Mere possession without more . . . will not be ground for
an inference of authority to sell . . ." the court said.2"9 The court
rather winks at the fact that this was more than mere possession,
it was possession with other goods, not distinguished, which were
held out for sale by a merchant. The edge has been honed off this
decision by the adoption in this state of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act which protects the person who buys from the conditional
vendee in the normal course of business-even though the condi-
2 16 By stressing the concept of title in considering the rights of the
original owner versus a subsequent good faith purchaser, the question of
whether the original owner intended to pass title to the middleman becomes
crucial. Thus, if the owner intended, to pass title, but not to the person
who took the property, no title actually passed to the person who took the
goods and thus there was no voidable title to pass to the good faith purchaser.
See, e.g. Dresher v. Roy Wilmeth Co., 118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260
(1948).
Subsection (1) (d) avoids the possibility of the argument that because
certain kinds of fraud are denominated larceny, and punished as such, that
the fraudulent taker has no power to pass a superior property right to a
good faith purchaser. Note, for example, that W. VA. CODE, ch. 61, art. 3,
§ 20 (Michie 1955) states that any person guilty of the kinds of embezzle-
ment described therein is "guilty of larceny" of the property involved.
217 136 W. Va. 284, 67 S.E.2d 432 (1951).
218 53 W. Va. 415, 44 S.E. 280 (1903).
219 1d., syllabus 2.
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tional vendor has filed notice of his retained title interest.2 And
adoption at the recent session of the legislature of the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act adopts the same view that the buyer in the normal
course of business can defeat the security interest of a financing
agency which has filed proper notice of its security interest in the
merchant's stock. 21
The protection of buyers "in the stream of commerce" '222 grows
to maturity in the Code provision. The concept already has a strong
beach head in this state. One reservation, not readily apparent from
a reading of this Code provision alone, should be noted here, though.
In the definition section of the general article of the Code, one who
buys from a pawn broker is excluded from the definition of "buyer
in the ordinary course of business." '223
Section 2-501. Insurable Interest in Goods; Manner of Identifica-
tion of Goods.
(1) The buyer obtains a special property and an insurable
interest in goods by identification of existing goods as goods to which
the contract refers even though the goods so identified are non-con-
forming and he has an option to return or reject them. Such identi-
fication can be made at any time and in any manner explicitly agreed
to by the parties. In the absence of explicit agreement identification
occurs
(a) when the contract is made if it is for the sale of goods
already existing and identified;
(b) if the contract is for the sale of future goods other than
those described in paragraph (c), when goods are
shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the seller
as goods to which the contract refers;
(c) when the crops are planted or otherwise become grow-
ing crops or the young are conceived if the contract is
for the sale of unborn young to be born within twelve
months after contracting or for the sale of crops to be
harvested within twelve months or the next normal
harvest season after contracting whichever is longer.
22°W. VA. CODE, ch. 40, art. 3, § 9 (Michie 1955); UNIFORM CONDITIONAL
SALEs AcT § 9.
221 W. Va. Laws, 1961 ch. 76 § 9 (2) (a). (This becomes ch. 28, art.
15, § 9 (2) (a) of the CODE.) UNiFORm TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 9 (2) (a).
222 See Vold's interesting comments on the "stream of commerce" con-
cept at VOLD, SALEs § 30, at 179 (2d ed. 1959).223 U.C.C. 1-201 (9).
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(2) The seller retains an insurable interest in goods so long as
title to or any security interest in the goods remains in him and where
the identification is by the seller alone he may until default or
insolvency or notification to the buyer that the identification is final
substitute other goods for those identified.
(3) Nothing in this section impairs any insurable interest recog-
nized under any other statute or rule of law.
Part 4 of the Sales Article threw away the title key which
is presently the answer to most sales law riddles. Part 5 in turn
goes back to resolve these problems, avoiding the all or nothing at
all title approach of the existing law.
The present provision deals with when identification occurs
and fixes certain rights in relation to identification. The buyer gets
an insurable interest in the goods and a special property interest
(dealt with in the next section) upon identification. The rules as
to when identification occurs stated in subsections (1) (a) through
(1) (c) apply unless there is an explicit agreement to the contrary.
The present law looks to appropriation as the genesis of the buyer's
rights in the goods and qualifies the presumed time of appropriation
by a general intent of the parties.224 This of course invites a broader
inquiry and provides for more ambiguity than the narrower allow-
ance for variations in the "explicit agreement" phase.
Subsection (1) (c) is worthy of special mention here since its
effect ranges well beyond the present section. Section 2-107 (2)
provides that a present sale may be made of things which may be
identified and that such sales are sales of goods. Subsection (1)
(c) says that crops and unborn young of animals may be identified
at conception, or at planting, or when they become growing crops.
There is no resort to the concepts of fructus industriales or fructus
naturales in the crop situations-thus nursery stock or Christmas
trees may be identified and the subject of a present sale. 2s
In addition, the seller's right to substitute goods under most
circumstances after he has alone identified them is reserved in sub-
224 Appropriation passes the title and all the risks and rights of owner-
ship. See Ailes & Goodwin, Some Comments on the Appropriation Tangle
in the Law of Sales, 45 W. VA. L. Q. 319 (1939). The Uniform Sales Act
states the rules of when title passed (i.e. when appropriation occurred) in
section 19, which leads off with this phrase: "Unless a different intention
appears, . . ."
22 See 1 WILLISTON, SALEs §§ 61, 62 (rev. ed. 1948).
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section (2) and his insurable interest in the goods is given liberal
scope. As to the latter point, existing West Virginia law is, no doubt,
in accord.22
Section 2-502. Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Insolvency.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and even though the goods have
not been shipped a buyer who has paid a part or all of the price of
goods in which he has a special property under the provisions of the
immediately preceding section may on making and keeping good a
tender of an unpaid portion of their price recover them from the
seller if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of
the first installment on their price.
(2) If the identification creating his special property has been
made by the buyer he acquires the right to recover the goods only
if they conform to the contract for sale.
The buyer's special property interest arising from identification
considered in the preceding section has no parallel in present West
Virginia law. The buyer's interest in the goods now depends upon
his title to the goods.2 2 7 It should be noted that the interest here is
limited by (1) the fact that the buyer's right to the goods arises
under this provision only when the seller becomes insolvent within
ten days after payment of the first installment,"' and (2) by sub-
section (2) which prohibits a buyer from identifying goods of greater
value than were called for by the contract and thus obtain a wind-
fall at the expense of other creditors of the insolvent seller.
Section 2-503. Manner of Seller's Tender of Delivery.
(1) Tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold
conforming goods at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer any
notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery. The
manner, time and place for tender are determined by the agreement
and this Article, and in particular
226 The vendor's insurable interest in realty has been recognized, Bow-
man v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 113 W. Va. 784, 169 S.E. 443 (1933) as has
the buyer's interest under a conditional sale. Cook v. Citizens Ins. Co., 105
W. Va. 375, 143 S.E. 113 (1928).
227 See generally, J. E. Poling Co. v. Huffman & Frost, 84 W. Va. 199,
99 S.E. 445 (1919); Revelle v. McQuay, 85 W. Va. 129, 101 S.E. 76 (1919);
Young v. Edwards, 64 W. Va. 67, 60 S.E. 992 (1908).
228 Where insolvency occurs outside the ten-day period, the rights of the
buyer advancing money on the purchase price is covered generally by article 9.
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(a) tender must be at a reasonable hour, and if it is of
goods they must be kept available for the period rea-
sonably necessary to enable the buyer to take posses-
sion; but
(b) unless otherwise agreed the buyer must furnish facili-
ties reasonably suited to the receipt of the goods.
(2) Where the case is within the next section respecting ship-
ment tender requires that the seller comply with its provisions.
(3) Where the seller is required to deliver at a particular desti-
nation tender requires that he comply with subsection (1) and also
in any appropriate case tender documents as described in subsections
(4) and (5) of this section.
(4) Where goods are in the possession of a bailee and are to be
delivered without being moved
(a) tender requires that the seller either tender a negotiable
document of title covering such goods or procure ac-
knowledgement by the bailee of the buyer's right to
possession of the goods; but
(b) tender to the buyer of a non-negotiable document of
title or of a written direction to the bailee to deliver
is sufficient tender unless the buyer seasonably objects,
and receipt by the bailee of notification of the buyer's
rights fixes those rights as against the bailee and all
third persons; but risk of loss of the goods and of any
failure by the bailee to honor the non-negotiable docu-
ment of title or to obey the direction remains on the
seller until the buyer has had a reasonable time to
present the document or direction, and a refusal by the
bailee to honor the document or to obey the direction
defeats the tender.
(5) Where the contract requires the seller to deliver documents
(a) he must tender all such documents in correct form,
except as provided in this Article with respect to bills
of lading in a set (subsection (2) of Section 2-323); and
(b) tender through customary banking channels is suf-
ficient and dishonor of a draft accompanying the docu-
ments constitutes non-acceptance or rejection.
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Present West Virginia law says very little about tender. The
Code provision here says a great deal. Risk of loss hinges in some
situations under tender,229 thus what amounts to tender takes on
greater significance under the Code than it has under present law.
Buried in one of Judge Green's lengthy opinions, however, is
some reflection on tender. In this case, Bloyd v. M. & I. Pollock,230
the seller undertook to deliver a carload of wheat to the buyer at
Wheeling. The wheat was damaged by flood while still on the car
on a rail siding in Wheeling about twenty-four hours after its arrival.
The question was: Had the risk of loss passed to the buyer at the
time of damage. The answer was: Yes. Judge Green ruled that
the title and risk passed to the buyer at the moment the wheat ar-
rived at the depot in Wheeling. This rushes tender a little bit and
gives the buyer small chance to exercise dominion over the goods.
The Code requires tender at a reasonable hour and requires notifica-
tion of the buyer. In the Bloyd case, the wheat arrived between
five and six o'clock in the afternoon-probably not a reasonable hour
to start unloading a carload of wheat. But the buyer received notice
of the shipment around eight o'clock the following morning and
failed to take the goods before it was damaged late in the afternoon
of that day. The Code would direct a result consistent with that of
the Bloyd case, but it would do so because the goods were at the
buyer's disposal during normal business hours on the day following
their arrival and the notice given the buyer was no doubt adequate
to meet the Code requirement.
One other West Virginia case, Franklin v. Pence,23' could be
stretched to support a position contrary to that pronounced in sub-
section (5) (b), but the issue was not very clearly presented in
that case. The seller was defending his refusal to continue delivery
under a series of orders placed by the plaintiff buyer in that case
because a sight draft for a previous order had been dishonored.2 32
229 U.C.C. § 2-509.
23027 W. Va. 75 (1885). Some of Judge Green's opinions run well
over one hundred pages. This particular one was a relatively concise seventy-
five pages long, most of it devoted to the possible liability of the common
carrier involved in shipping the goods-though the common carrier was not
a party to the case.
231 128 W. Va. 353, 36 S.E.2d 505 (1945).
232 In Tuggle v. Belcher, 104 W. Va. 178, 139 S.E. 653 (1927) it was
held that a seller could refuse to ship a second carload of lumber products
until a prior carload had been paid for, no credit being agreed upon and
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The question of whether the dishonor of the draft amounted to a
rejection was not raised, and the question of just what effect the
dishonor of the sight draft had upon the seller's duty to continue
performance was generally ignored. The Code view on this point
is commendable, and at best the West Virginia position is confused.
Section 2-504. Shipment by Seller.
Where the seller is required or authorized to send the goods to
the buyer and the contract does not require him to deliver them at a
particular destination, then unless otherwise agreed he must
(a) put the goods in the possession of such a carrier and
make such a contract for their transportation as may
be reasonable having regard to the nature of the goods
and other circumstances of the case; and
(b) obtain and promptly deliver or tender in due form any
document necessary to enable the buyer to obtain pos-
session of the goods or otherwise required by the agree-
ment or by usage of trade; and
(c) promptly notify the buyer of the shipment.
Failure to notify the buyer under paragraph (c) or to make a proper
contract under paragraph (a) is a ground for rejection only if ma-
terial delay or loss ensues.
It has been held in this state that it is the buyer's obligation
to furnish cars under an F.O.B. point of shipment contract. In
Wiggin v. Marsh,233 this appears to have been held as a general
rule of law, and in Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Lake
& Export Coal Co.,2"4 it appears that such an obligation could be
inferred from course of dealing or usage of the trade. This general
assumption would be reversed by the Code provision which places
upon the seller the obligation of making the contract for transporta-
tion-subject of course to a contrary agreement between the parties.
The contrary agreement may arise either from express terms or from
course of dealing or custom of the trade. It is believed that the
assumption of the Code that the seller bears the obligations imposed
233 77 W. Va. 7, 87 S.E. 194 (1915).
234 93 W. Va. 155, 116 S.E. 145 (1923).
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by this provision absent such agreement reflects fairly common busi-
ness practice where buyer and seller deal at a distance.
Section 2-505. Seller's Shipment Under Reservation.
(1) Where the seller has identified goods to the contract by
or before shipment:
(a) his procurement of a negotiable bill of lading to his
own order or otherwise reserves in him a security
interest in the goods. His procurement of the bill to
the order of a financing agency or of the buyer indicates
in addition only the seller's expectation of transferring
that interest to the person named.
(b) a non-negotiable bill of lading to himself or his nom-
inee reserves possession of the goods as security but
except in a case of conditional delivery (subsection (2)
of Section 2-507) a non-negotiable bill of lading nam-
ing the buyer as consignee reserves no security interest
even though the seller retains possession of the bill
of lading.
(2) When shipment by the seller with reservation of a security
interest is in violation of the contract for sale it constitutes an im-
proper contract for transportation within the preceding section but
impairs neither the rights given to the buyer by shipment and identi-
fication of the goods to the contract nor the seller's powers as a holder
of a negotiable document.
This provision would reverse existing West Virginia law as in
this state the reservation of a security interest has been held to
affect the passing of title and thus in turn to change the point at
which risk of loss shifts and other incidents of title occur.235 Contra-
wise, this provision recognizes the seller's right to retain a security
interest in the goods to insure payment without affecting other in-
cidents of the sales transactions. The Uniform Sales Act had a gen-
erally similar provision,236 but these were aimed at emphasizing the
"rightfulness" of the seller's reservation of the security interest. The
235 Allen & Wheeler Co. v. Farr, 81 W. Va. 150, 93 S.E. 1030 (1917);
Black & Greiwe v. Smith, 66 S.E. 1 (1909).23
6 UNIFORM SALEs AcT § 20.
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assumption is that the seller has a right to retain this security interest,
but the present section deals more with the rights and duties of
the parties to the transaction where such an interest is reserved.23
Section 2-506. Rights of Financing Agency.
(1) A financing agency by paying or purchasing for value a
draft which relates to a shipment of goods acquires to the extent of
the payment or purchase and in addition to its own rights under the
draft and any document of title securing it any rights of the shipper
in the goods including the right to stop delivery and the shipper's
right to have the draft honored by the buyer.
(2) The right to reimbursement of a financing agency which
has in good faith honored or purchased the draft under commitment
to or authority from the buyer is not impaired by subsequent dis-
covery of defects with reference to any relevant document which was
apparently regular on its face.
No relevant West Virginia authority is found upon the points
covered by this provision. The section is aimed primarily at insuring
the financing agency's authority to exercise the shipper's rights, sub-
section (1), and fixing a financing agency's right to reimbursement
by the terms of the papers it accepts at the time it purchases or
honors a draft. "Financing agency" is broadly defined in section
2-104 to include generally banks or any other institution or agency
which intervenes in the financing or collecting process under a sale
of goods.
Section 2-507. Effect of Seller's Tender; Delivery on Condition.
(1) Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty to
accept the goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay for
them. Tender entitles the seller to acceptance of the goods and to
payment according to the contract.
(2) Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to
the buyer of goods or documents of tifle, his right as against the seller
to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making the
payment due.
2 3 7 U.C.C. § 2-505, Comment 1.
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Tender and payment are considered concurrent conditions, un-
less otherwise agreed, according to this section and according to ex-
isting West Virginia law.238 It should be noted that the language
of subsection (2) is drawn cautiously so as to avoid conflict with
section 2-403. Only the buyer's rights as against the seller are
here dealt with, the rights of a third party who may purchase the
goods received by the buyer under a conditional delivery would
be controlled by section 2-403.
Section 2-508. Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery;
Replacement.
(1) Where any tender of delivery by the seller is rejected be-
cause non-conforming and the time for performance has not yet
expired, the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to
cure and may then within the contract time make a conforming
delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which
the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with
or without money allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies
the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming
tender.
No present West Virginia authority specifically authorizes the
"cure" of tender as in this section. A somewhat similar concept
may be drawn from Emerson Shoe Co. v. Neely.239 There the seller
tendered a conforming delivery far in advance of the date set for
performance and the buyer rejected, but was held liable on the
contract when the seller made a second tender when the time for
performance subsequently did arise, which also was rejected. It is
inferrable from the decision in this case that the seller is not
limited unreasonably to one tender under all situations.
Subsection (2) may extend the seller's time for tender. It would
cover the situation where the precise quantity or quality of the
tender may be subject to some variation, and the seller reasonably
believes his tender would be acceptable. A situation somewhat con-
238 E.g., Tuggle v. Belchur, 104 W. Va. 178, 139 S.E. 653 (1927);
Kern v. Zeigler, 13 W. Va. 707 (1878).
23999 W. Va. 657, 129 S.E. 718 (1925); Cf. Linger v. Wilson, 73 W. Va.
669, 80 S.E. 1108 (1914). (Buyer held to waive objection to a curable
defect, an overage in a shipment of wheat, by relying first on another reason
for rejecting seller's tender.)
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verse to this arose in Fox v. Ritter-Burns Lumber Co.,24 where the
buyer rightfully rejected a totally inadequate tender. The seller, of
course, must have reasonable grounds to believe that his tender would
be acceptable.
Section 2-509. Risk of Loss in the Absence of Breach.
(1) Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to
ship the goods by carrier
(a) if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular
destination, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when
the goods are duly delivered to the carrier even though
the shipment is under reservation (Section 2-505); but
(b) if it does require him to deliver them at a particular
destination and the goods are there duly tendered while
in the possession of the carrier, the risk of loss passes
to the buyer when the goods are there duly so tendered
as to enable the buyer to take delivery.
(2) Where the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered with-
out being moved, the risk of loss passes to the buyer
(a) on his receipt of a negotiable document of title covering
the goods; or
(b) on acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer's right
to possession of the goods; or
(c) after his receipt of a non-negotiable document of title
or other written direction to deliver, as provided in
subsection (4) (b) of Section 2-503.
(3) In any case not within subsection (1) or (2), the risk of loss
passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a
merchant; otherwise the risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery.
(4) The provisions of this section are subject to contrary agree-
ment of the parties and to the provisions of this Article on sale on
approval (Section 2-327) and on effect of breach on risk of loss
(Section 2-510).
Under present law, risk of loss is normally an incident of title.
With the title concept abandoned by the Code, this provision allocates
240 91 W. Va. 542, 114 S.E. 141 (1922).
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the risk in substantially the same manner as it is placed via the title
vehicle under present law.24' A few more specific changes occur
under West Virginia law than under common law generally and
Uniform Sales Act law because of some peculiarities in the law of
this state.
242
Subsection (1) deals with those situations where shipment of
the goods is involved. Normally a seller's risk of loss ends with
his delivery of the goods to the carrier.2 43  Subsection (1) (a)
specifically states this, and emphasizes the fact that a reservation
of a security interest by the seller does not alter the rule. This
latter point changes the law in West Virginia where it has been
held that the reservation of a security interest was a retention of
"title" by the seller casting upon him the risk of loss during transit.
2 44
Subsection (1) (b) deals with the transfer of the risk where
the seller undertakes delivery of the goods at a destination,2 4' e.g.
an F.O.B. destination rather than F.O.B. point of shipment contract.
In this case, risk of loss passes upon tender. An early West Virginia
case held that risk of loss passed immediately upon the arrival of
the goods at the destination.2 46 The Code would extend the seller's
risk here by the "duly so tendered" phrase so that the buyer would
not assume the risk until he had an opportunity to take possession
of the goods.
241 Greater precision is achieved under the Code provisions than under
common law, while the same degree of flexibility is retained. Common law
considered intent as the guiding factor in determining when title passes,
and thus the general rules of when title is assumed to pass under various
circumstances must always be hedged by the possibility that a different in-
tention might possibly be inferred from the peculiar facts of the case. The
rules of the Code section apply unless there is a different agreement by
the parties changing the point at which the risk of loss shifts. This requires
a more precise showing and cannot be so easily inferred from quivocal cir-
cumstances than the showing of a "contrary intent" concerning a more general
concept of title.
242 E.g. Under the UN'ioRm SALEs ACT § 20, a reservation of a security
interest in the goods shipped did not affect the passing of title and risk of
loss, while under West Virginia law, a contrary rule obtains. See note 245,
infra.
243 Bennett & Hester v. Dayton, 102 W. Va. 197, 135 S.E. 13 (1926);
Mullins v. Farris, 100 W. Va. 540, 131 S.E. 6 (1925); Wholesale Coal Co.
v. Price Hill Colliery Co., 98 W. Va. 438, 128 S.E. 313 (1925). UNIEORM
SALES ACT § 19 Rule 4 (2).
244 Back & Greiwe v. Smith, 66 W. Va. 47, 66 S.E. 1 (1909).
245 See Ailes & Goodwin, Some Comments on the Appropriation Tangle
in 1he Law of Sales, 45 W. VA. L. Q. 319 (1939).
24 6 Bloyd v. M. & J. Pollock, 27 W. Va. 75 (1885).
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Subsection (2) makes no significant change.
Subsection (3) does change the allocation of risks somewhat.
Under the normal title approach, an unconditional contract to sell
an identified article normally passes title and thus risk of loss im-
mediately upon the contracting.2 " Subsection (3) ignores the title
concepts here and views possession as more significant where a
merchant seller is involved.248 Thus where the seller is a merchant,
risk of loss passes upon the receipt by the buyer. Where the seller
is not a merchant, risk of loss passes upon tender and the alloca-
tion of risk remains much the same as under present law.249
Subsection (4) qualifies the general application of the rules of
this provision by recognizing the authority of parties to allocate risks
by agreement 5 . and by reference to situations where risk of loss is
covered under other special circumstances.
Section 2-510. Effect of Breach on Risk of Loss.
(1) Where a tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to
the contract as to give a right of rejection the risk of their loss
remains on the seller until cure or acceptance.
2 4 7 UNWORM SALES AcT § 19 Rule 1. But Compare, Morgan v. King,
28 W. Va. 1 (1886) with Hood v. Block Bros., 29 W. Va. 244, 11 S.E. 910
(1886).
248 U.C.C. § 2-509, Comment 4: 'The underlying theory of this rule
is that a merchant who is to make physical delivery at his own place of
business continues meanwhile to control the goods and can be expected to
insure his interest in them. The buyer, on the other hand, has no control
of the goods and it is extremely unlikely that he will carry insurance on
goods not yet in his possession."
249 Tender requires that the seller put conforming goods at the buyer's
disposal at a reasonable hour and with adequate notice to enable the buyer
to take possession. Section 2-503. These rules in regard to tender con-
template the usual merchant seller situation. The Code is not so clear as
to the point at which the risk of loss shifts where the seller is not a
merchant, because its rules regarding tender simply don't anticipate this
situation precisely. For example, suppose an individual sells a piano no
longer used in the home through a newspaper want-ad. The Code is not
clear as to whether tender would occur when the seller agreed. 'Take it any-
time you want it," or not until later when the buyer has had a reasonable
opportunity to make arrangements for its removal. The provision on tender
would seem to contemplate that tender is complete when the seller "puts and
holds the goods" at the buyer's disposition. But it would seem more com-
patible with the provisions of the instant section on risk of loss that the
risk not pass until the buyer has a reasonable opportunity to actually exercise
dominion over the goods.
250 See, I. E. Poling Co. v. Huffman & Frost, 84 W. Va. 199, 99 S.E.
445 (1919) where it was specifically agreed that the seller would retain the
risk of fire loss as to lumber remaining at his mill site. The court used this
agreement to argue that the parties intended title to the lumber to pass
to the buyer as the lumber was manufactured since such express agreement
as to the allocation of risks would have been unnecessary if the title to the
lumber had remained with the seller at this point in the transaction,
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(2) Where the buyer rightfully revokes acceptance he may to
the extent of any deficiency in his effective insurance coverage treat
the risk of loss as having rested on the seller from the beginning.
(3) Where the buyer as to conforming goods already identified
to the contract for sale repudiates or is otherwise in breach before
risk of their loss has passed to him, the seller may to the extent of
any deficiency in his effective insurance coverage treat the risk of
loss as resting on the buyer for a commercially reasonable time.
Breach does not presently have a direct bearing upon the shift-
ing of or the reallocation of the risks of loss under a sales transaction.
But indirectly, breach may have that effect. In general terms, the
adoption of this provision would broaden slightly the protection
afforded to a non-breaching party who still retained control, and
thus bore the risk of loss, of goods identified to a contract of sale.
For example, a repudiation of an executory contract for sale by
the buyer amounting to a breach prevents the seller from passing
the title to the goods to the buyer25 '-and thus the buyer never sus-
tains any risk of loss under present law in this situation. Under
the Code, the buyer could be forced to bear a part of that risk,
if goods had been identified to the contract. 52 Aside from the fact
that the quantum of the risk under these narrow situations is quali-
fied by the non-breaching party's insurance coverage, no substantial
change would result in existing law."
Section 2-511. Tender of Payment by Buyer; Payment by Check.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed tender of payment is a condition
to the seller's duty to tender and complete any delivery.
"I Acme Food Co. v. Older, 64 W. Va. 255, 61 S.E. 235 (1908). See
also Norman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 100 W. Va. 515, 131 S.E.
12 (1925). (Seller's shipment of non-conforming goods; buyer rightfully
rejected and sold for seller's account. Had goods been lost or damaged in
transit, the loss no doubt would have been seller's risk even though title
normally passes upon delivery of such goods to the carrier.)
252 Notice that "identification" can occur earlier in the sales transaction
than "appropriation" under present sales law. See U.C.C. § 2-501.
2-3 See Queen v. Kenova Hardwood Flooring Co., 114 W. Va. 623, 173
S.E. 559 (1934). (Seller had moved goods to point of loading at buyer's
request but buyer failed to inspect there and goods were never loaded. Loss
resulting from deterioration was held the buyer's loss.) Compare, Black &
Sons v. Johnson & Sons, 65 W. Va. 518, 64 S.E. 626 (1909). (Buyer's
failure to inspect goods moved to loading point held to prevent title passing
from seller to buyer, thus permitting seller to make another sale of the
same goods.)
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(2) Tender of payment is sufficient when made by any means
or in any manner current in the ordinary course of business unless
the seller demands payment in legal tender and gives any extension
of time reasonably necessary to procure it.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Act on the effect of an
instrument on an obligation (Section 3-802), payment by check is
conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of
the check on due presentment.
This section continues the recognition of tender of performance
and tender of payment being concurrent conditions unless a credit
term is agreed upon. Subsections (2) and (3) would provide some
additional precision to the law. Subsection (2) would prevent a
seller from tricking a buyer out of the advantage of his bargain
by a surprise demand for legal tender. Subsection (3) declares a
payment by check to be a conditional payment as between the im-
mediate parties, whereas present law says it is a question of fact
as to whether payment by check is an absolute or a conditional
payment. 54 Notice, however, that the phrase "as between the parties"
does not permit the rule of conditional payment to impose upon the
rights of third parties who may, after delivery, obtain rights in the
goods. Thus, under section 2-401 of the Code a subpurchaser
could have greater rights in property delivered than the original
seller even though a check taken as payment is dishonored.
Section 2-512. Payment by Buyer Before Inspection.
(1) Where the contract requires payment before inspection
non-conformity of the goods does not excuse the buyer from so
making payment unless
(a) the non-conformity appears without inspection; or
(b) despite tender of the required documents the circum-
stances would justify injunction against honor under
the provisions of this Act (Section 5-114).
(2) Payment pursuant to subsection (1) does not constitute an
acceptance of goods or impair the buyer's right to inspect or any
of his remedies.
254See v. Hardy Motor Co., 118 W. Va. 676, 191 S.E. 580 (1937);
Garrett v. Patton, 81 W. Va. 771, 95 S.E. 437 (1918).
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Neither of the points covered by this provision are resolved
under present West Virginia law. No authority is found on the
point of when a buyer is excused from making payments before
inspection where the contract anticipates such. On the second point,
the reservation of the buyer's right of inspection (and rejection)
after payment is made, it could be inferred from Norman Lumber
Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co.255 that payment before inspection, and
before there is opportunity for inspection, does not affect the buyer's
right to reject the goods shipped. It appears there that payment
was made against invoices before the non-conforming goods ar-
rived at the buyer's place of business.
Section 2-513. Buyer's Right to Inspection of Goods.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed and subject to subsection (3),
where goods are tendered or delivered or identified to the contract
for sale, the buyer has a right before payment or acceptance to
inspect them at any reasonable place and time and in any reasonable
manner. When the seller is required or authorized to send the goods
to the buyer, the inspection may be after their arrival.
(2) Expenses of inspection must be borne by the buyer but
may be recovered from the seller if the goods do not conform and
are rejected.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed and subject to the provision of
this Article on C.I.F. contracts (subsection (3) of Section 2-321),
the buyer is not entitled to inspect the goods before payment of the
price when the contract provides
(a) for delivery "C.O.D." or on other like terms; or
(b) for payment against documents of title, except where
such payment is due only after the goods are to become
available for inspection.
(4) A place or method of inspection fixed by the parties is
presumed to be exclusive but unless otherwise expressly agreed it
does not postpone identification or shift the place for delivery or
for passing the risk of loss. If compliance become impossible, inspec-
tion shall be as provided in this section unless the place or method
fixed was clearly intended as an indispensable condition failure of
which avoids the contract.
255 100 W. Va. 515, 131 S.E. 12 (1925).
E Vol. 64
71
Lorensen: The Uniform Commercial Code Sales Article Compared with West Virg
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1962
COMMERCIAL CODE-SALES
There are two different kinds of inspections involved in sales
transactions-one a dickering inspection, the other a performance
inspection. The dickering inspection is one which is a part of the
negotiations; the ostensible buyer is requested to inspect the goods
offered for sale to ascertain their quality and fitness for himself.
This pre-sale inspection has the effect of limiting the seller's implied
warranties under present law and under the Code section dealing
with limitations and disclaimers of warranties.256 The second kind
of inspection, the performance inspection, occurs after the contract
of sale has been consummated and affords the buyer an opportunity
to check the quality of the goods tendered under a pre-existing con-
tract to assure himself that the tendered goods conform to the
contract. It perhaps belabors the point to be so pedantic, but to
make some sense out of the West Virginia cases touching upon
inspections and relate this to the Code position requires a well-
understood foundation.
The Code section here concerned deals with a cluster of narrow
questions related to the performance inspection. When has the
buyer the right of inspection? Subsection (1) says before payment
and after the goods are identified under reasonable circumstances,
with certain exceptions. The exceptions noted deal with C.O.D.
contracts and the like and where the parties otherwise agree. Sub-
section (2) determines who bears the cost of inspection and sub-
section (4) establishes rules for those situations where the agreed
upon inspection becomes impossible.
Several West Virginia cases have implicitly recognized the usual
rule that a buyer may inspect at the destination where some ship-
ment is involved. 57 But the one case in West Virginia which most
directly calls the issue of inspection to task involved a buyer's claim
that he had a right to inspect and reject at the destination and
this issue became completely garbled. The case is Guyandotte Coal
Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Mach. Works." '8 There the Coal Company
contracted to buy a used mining machine. The machine was at
Birmingham, Alabama. The buyer was located at Kitchen, West
Virginia. There was a conflict in the evidence concerning the seller's
warranties; the seller's position being that it refused to warrant the
256 U.C.C. § 2-316 (3) (b).
25 Norman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 100 W. Va. 515, 131
S.E. 12 (1925). Schaffner v. National Supply Co., 80 W. Va. 111, 92 S.E.
580 (1917).2 5 8 94 W. Va. 300, 118 S.E. 512 (1923).
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machine at all and demanded the buyer inspect it; the buyer's position
being that the machine had been warranted as being in "first class
condition." The court held that since the written contract did not
mention warranties, the seller was obligated to deliver a merchantable
second-hand mining machine. Taking this view of the case, the
court made the following statement concerning the trial court's re-
jection of an instruction offered by the plaintiff buyer:
"This instruction, if given, would have told the jury, in
effect, that the place of delivery under the contract was at
Kitchen and that the plaintiff had the right to inspect and reject
the machine at that point notwithstanding, that under the con-
tract and under the manifest intention of the parties as disclosed
by the evidence, this machine was to be delivered at Birming-
ham, Alabama, at that point the plaintiff had the right to
examine and reject the machine. . .. "'19
Because the court here confused the dickering inspection-that is,
the seller's demand that the buyer predetermine the quality of the
goods offered prior to the sale-with the buyer's performance in-
spection, this case could be construed to mean that a seller can
cut off the buyer's right of inspection by demanding it be done at
the point of shipment.
Needless to say, the most significant impact of the adoption of
this provision in West Virginia would be one of clarification.
Section 2-514. When Documents Deliverable on Acceptance;
When on Payment.
Unless otherwise agreed documents against which a draft is
drawn are to be delivered to the drawee on acceptance of the draft
if it is payable more than three days after presentment; otherwise,
only on payment.
No West Virginia authority is found upon this point.
Section 2-515. Preserving Evidence of Goods in Dispute.
In furtherance of the adjustment of any claim or dispute
(a) either party on reasonable notification to the other and
for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and preserving
259 Id. at 312, 118 S.E. at 516.
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evidence has the right to inspect, test and sample the
goods including such of them as may be in the posses-
sion or control of the other; and
(b) the parties may agree to a third party inspection or
survey to determine the conformity or condition of the
goods and may agree that the findings shall be binding
upon them in any subsequent litigation or adjustment.
This provision has no parallel in present West Virginia law as
procedures peculiar to sales transactions. Rule 34 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes inspection of "things"
in the control of an adversary and article 10 of chapter 55 of the
West Virginia Code establishes general rules for arbitration. Basic-
ally, the only change which would result from the adoption of this
section would be the giving to the party not in control of the goods
concerned a legal right to "inspect, test and sample" goods in the
control of another party involved in sales transaction even though
no litigation is pending and thus no discovery process available. The
aim of the provisions is to promote amicable settlements on the
merits.
(Discussion of the Sales Article will be concluded in the next issue.)
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